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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF BRITAIN 
A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large 
American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are 
passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the 
Berle-Means paradigm - the belief that separation of ownership 
and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation -
reigned supreme.1 Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable 
result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collec-
tive action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns 
only a small fraction of a large firm's shares. 
A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypoth-
eses have recently been offered to explain shareholder passivity. 
According to a new "political" theory of corporate governance, fi-
nancial institutions in the United States are not naturally apathetic 
but rather have been regulated into submission by legal rules that 
- sometimes intentionally, sometimes inadvertently - hobble 
American institutions and raise the costs of participation in corpo-
rate governance.2 
The principal policy implication of this new political theory of 
the American corporation is obvious: deregulate in order to lower 
the costs of coordination among shareholders. Relaxing various 
legal restrictions and barriers - including the Glass-Steagall Act's 
prohibition against combining commercial and investment banking 
and federal securities rules that chill group formation by institu-
tional investors - would significantly enhance the ability and in-
centives of institutional investors to monitor corporate managers. 
This is an important claim, but also one not easily tested. 
The new political theory of the corporation has not, however, 
won universal acceptance. Although agreeing that American insti-
tutional investors are in some respects overregulated and thereby 
chilled from fuller participation in corporate governance, other 
scholars have doubted that legal restraints can serve as the central 
pillar of a revised theory of shareholder passivity.3 In contrast to 
the political theorists, who focus on regulatory barriers that raise 
1. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER c. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
2. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 
(1990); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 
10 (1991). 
3. See, e.g., Louis LoWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 209-33 
(1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Sig-
nificance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 19 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991). 
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the costs of participation in corporate governance, these critics re-
spond that existing incentives - particularly those of fund manag-
ers - are too weak to motivate active institutional monitoring, 
even if regulatory barriers were reduced.4 The attractions (real or 
imagined) of the exit option of selling into a liquid securities market 
further reduce the likelihood that even large shareholders will or-
ganize to resist management. 
The two authors of this article have been on opposite sides of 
this debate, but both recognize that no single explanation is com-
plete and that other factors, such as the self-interest of fund manag-
ers, the conflicts of interest faced by institutions who want to retain 
corporate business, cultural forces, collective action problems, and 
what we can call path dependence - the difficulty of changing the 
structure and behavior of highly evolved and specialized institutions 
- have causal roles in explaining shareholder passivity.s The cen-
tral question in research on American corporate governance is how 
these forces interact to produce the characteristic passivity of most 
American institutions. 
The debate between the proponents and critics of a political the-
ory of American corporate governance is in some respects untest-
able. We cannot run the legal experiment of changing our laws to 
facilitate institutional oversight of corporate managers and observe 
how the institutions act. Still less can we go back sixty years or 
more, change our laws then, and see how the institutions would act 
if they had grown up in a different legal and political environment. 
In similar settings, however, social scientists have long used "natu-
ral experiments" to gain insight into how a particular legal rule af-
fects behavior across otherwise similar societies.6 Comparative 
study of corporate governance in other industrialized countries of-
fers insight into how American corporate governance might have 
developed under a different legal regime and how governance prac-
tices might change if legal rules were changed today. 
4. Both sides in this debate agree, however, that many regulatory barriers to shareholder 
collective action should be reduced or removed. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and 
the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994). 
5. For an effort to develop a multicausal statement of the political model, see Bernard S. 
Black, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Case for Institutional Voice, J, 
APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Fall 1992, at 19, 21-24. 
6. The best-known - and most controversial - context in which natural experiments 
have been used to inform a policy debate has been the debate over capital punishment. 
Scholars have looked to the crime rate in contiguous - and presumably similar - American 
jurisdictions, one having the death penalty and one not. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. Z1MRINO & 
GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 263-70 
(1973). Without entering that debate, our approach in focusing on the United Kingdom is 
similar in nature. 
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To explore whether the paradigm American corporation, with 
its strong managers and widely dispersed shareholders, could be a 
product of American politics and the path-dependent evolution of 
American financial institutions, scholars have recently examined 
corporate governance in Japan and Germany, where commercial 
banks and, to a lesser extent, insurance companies control large eq-
uity stakes and sometimes closely monitor managements.7 The 
merits of these bank-centered systems, compared to more market-
centered systems (such as those ill the United States and the United 
Kingdom), and the transportability of bank-centered monitoring to 
other cultures and economic environments, have fueled a stimulat-
ing debate that will occupy corporate law scholars for some time to 
come. 
At this point, our interest in the United Kingdom begins to 
come into focus. The role of financial institutions in corporate gov-
ernance in the United Kingdom has attracted much less attention 
than the role of German and Japanese banks.8 Yet the United 
Kingdom has unique advantages for the effort to put American cor-
porate governance in comparative perspective and to understand 
how it might be improved and what role legal rules and other fac-
tors play in shaping our system of corporate governance. The legal 
culture of Britain is as similar to our own as we are likely to find; in 
Britain, like the United States and unlike most of the rest of the 
world, most large corporations are public and not family-controlled; 
the United Kingdom has long had a liquid securities market; the 
British "City" has the same array of financial institutions that we do 
(commercial banks, insurers, mutual funds, investment banks, pri-
vate and public pension funds); stock ownership in both Britain and 
the United States has come in the last few decades to be dominated 
7. See, e.g., W. CARL KEsTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CoR-
PORATE CoNTROL 53-81 (1991); Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate 
Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 51 BROOK. L. RE.v. 1 (1991); Coffee (1991), supra 
note 3; Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps 
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE LJ. 871 (1993); W. 
Carl Kester, Governance, Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look at Japan and Ger-
many, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Summer 1992, at 83; Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corpo-
rate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE LJ. 1927 (1993). 
8. Professor Paul Davies is an exception. See Paul L. Davies, Institutional Investors: A 
U.K. View, 51 BROOK. L. REv. 129 (1991); Paul L. Davies, Institutional Investors in the United 
Kingdom, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 257 (Theodor 
Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 1994). See also JONATHAN P. 
CHARKHAM, KEEPING GooD CoMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE IN FIVE 
CouNTRIES 248-343 (1994). We have each considered corporate governance in the United 
Kingdom briefly in earlier work. See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor 
Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. RE.v. 895, 927-31 {1992); Coffee {1991), 
supra note 3, at 1309-11. · 
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by institutions; and, most centrally, financial institutions in the 
United Kingdom are significantly less regulated than their Ameri-
can counterparts - though less regulated does not mean unregu-
lated. In particular, Britain has no counterpart to the Glass-
Steagall Act or to U.S. restrictions on interstate banking, which 
limit the size and power of American banks. Nor does it have our 
history of limiting stock ownership by insurance companies or regu-
lating collective shareholder action. 
Not only is the United Kingdom context similar to that of the 
United States, but British patterns of corporate governance may 
foreshadow future developments in the United States. The U.K. 
equities market is considerably more institutionally dominated than 
the U.S. stock market. U.K. institutions hold about two-thirds of all 
publicly traded British stocks, while U.S. institutions only hold 
around half of U.S. publicly traded stock.9 Shareholder concentra-
tion is also higher. The twenty-five largest institutional sharehold-
ers hold an absolute majority of the stock of many U.K. 
companies.10 For smaller U.K. firms, the five largest institutional 
holders control 30% or more of the shares. Prudential Corporation 
PLC, the largest British institutional investor, alone holds about 
3.5% of the entire British equity market.11 Several other institu-
tions are almost as large. Equally important, the world of British 
institutional investors is close-knit. Communication among them is 
easy and unregulated. This reduces the coordination costs and free 
rider problems that plague collective action in the United States. In 
short, Britain presents a model of what U.S. securities markets 
might look like if U.S. institutional holdings continue to grow -
and with many fewer legal barriers to institutional investor partici-
pation in corporate governance. 
To understand the behavior of British institutional investors, we 
relied partly on traditional written sources. But British institutions 
typically act behind closed doors. Only a handful of exceptional 
cases degenerate into a public battle between shareholders and 
managers. To probe this hidden world of informal monitoring, we 
9. For British data, see HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, EcoNOMJC TRENDS No. 
466, THE 1992 SHARE REGISTER SURVEY (1992) [hereinafter 1992 SHARE REGISTER SUR· 
VEY]. For the United States, see Financial Assets & Equity Holdings, BRANCATO REP. ON 
INSTITUTIONAL lNVEsTMENT (Victoria Group, Inc., Fairfax, Va.), Dec. 1993, at 42 tbl. 11. 
10. See Tony Jackson, The Institutions Get Militant, FJN. TIMES, June 11, 1991, at 18. 
11. See R.E. Artus, Tension to Continue, in CREATIVE TENSION? 12, 12 (National Assn. of 
Pension Funds, Ltd., 1990). 
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conducted a series of interviews with senior officers in major British 
institutions.12 
So what happens in this brave new world of limited regulation 
and lower coordination costs? One central conclusion is that if Ja-
pan and Germany show how American corporate governance might 
have developed very differently under different legal rules, Britain 
shows how American corporate governance might not look drasti-
cally different under more limited regulation. Major British institu-
tions intervene to change management, but only a handful of times 
per year. Absent a crisis, the institutions generally stay on the 
sidelines. 
Legal rules do matter. British institutions are significantly more 
active than their American counterparts. One likely reason is that 
American institutions cannot act jointly and quietly, in the pre-
ferred British pattern. In addition, poison pills, control-person lia-
bility, and other barriers chill and often prevent American 
institutions from forming coalitions, even in public. But differences 
in regulation alone cannot adequately explain the British mix of in-
stitutional activism and passivity. The costs of collective action re-
main considerable, money managers' interest in governance issues 
varies widely, and the alternative of exit by selling shares into the 
market remains demonstrably on money managers' minds. Money 
managers typically intervene only when doing so will improve their 
relative performance - when it will benefit their portfolio more 
than their competitors'. Conflicts of interest cause some money 
managers to shrink from open confrontation with corporate manag-
ers. (British law does even less than U.S. law to control these con-
flicts.) Ultimately, only a multifaceted explanation can capture the 
12. These interviews were conducted principally in the summer of 1992 and were ar-
ranged with the very helpful assistance of Jonathan Charkham. Until his recent retirement, 
Mr. Charkham was the Bank of England's in-house adviser on corporate governance matters. 
Due to promises of confidentiality, we cannot directly quote or identify the sources of spe-
cific comments on which we rely below. Among the fund managers and investment person-
nel interviewed were: Huw M. Jones, chief investment officer at Prudential Portfolio 
Managers (Britain's largest institutional investor); L.E. (Paddy) Linaker, chief executive of 
M&G, probably the most activist British mutual fund family; Paul Myners, chief executive at 
Gartmore Investment, currently the largest U.K. money manager; Charles Nunneley, the 
chief executive at Robert Fleming Asset Management; E. Michael Sandland, chairman of the 
Institutional Shareholders' Committee and chief investment officer for Norwich Union, a 
large insurer; and Dr. Paul Whitney, chief investment officer of CIN Management, which is 
the in·house fund manager for the British coal pension funds. All were interviewed in face-
to-face meetings by Professor Coffee, except for Sandland, who was interviewed by tele-
phone. For a recent newspaper account, describing several of these individuals as among the 
most significant actors in the British institutional investor community, see Patrick Weever & 
Topaz Amoore, Corporate Assassins: poor performers beware, the institutions are gunning for 
you, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 17, 1993, City Section, at 5 (listing recent instances in which 
chief executives have been replaced as the result of institutional activism). 
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complex environment in which institutional investors function in 
Great Britain. 
Path dependence in the evolution of financial institutions may 
be particularly important in understanding national differences in 
corporate governance systems. Institutional behavior is signifi-
cantly influenced by the manner in which classes of institutions 
have evolved within a particular country. For example, securities 
firms have different organizational cultures, time horizons, and 
human capital than commercial banks. The trading culture that de-
velops in these firms places greater emphasis on exploiting short-
term market movements than does the culture within a commercial 
bank, which is typically oriented toward longer-term monitoring. 
In this light, it is relevant that British securities firms are among the 
largest pension managers. Had pension management instead devel-
oped as an offshoot of commercial banking, pension managers 
might have adopted the longer time horizons and greater interest in 
monitoring that banks generally exhibit. 
To give another example, British banks invest a trivial 
percentage of their assets in common stocks. Although there are 
several explanations for why British banks shun investing in corpo-
rate equity, their institutional history again may be instructive. Un-
til well into this century, British regulatory policy discouraged 
banks from growing too large or owning sizable equity stakes. In 
contrast, government policies in Japari and Germany encouraged 
the emergence of dominant national banks and the establishment of 
close ties between banks and industrial companies. This difference 
in history could partly explain why British banks remain uninter-
ested in holding equities, even though regulatory obstacles to large 
equity holdings have been relaxed for some time. 
In short, having developed one set of organizational skills under 
one set of legal and political constraints, financial institutions are 
not so malleable as to develop new skills quickly - at least unless 
they expect substantial gains from the change. This leads to· a fur-
ther prediction: A rapid increase in institutional activism would re-
quire the visible success of a first mover, who engages in a high 
level of monitoring and achieves a substantial payoff in portfolio 
performance. Such a success story might cause institutions that 
now have a trading orientation to make the investments in human 
capital and organizational redesign that would let them compete 
with the first mover. Absent such a visible success, change is likely 
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to be gradual and incremental. This has been both the American 
and the British pattern to date.13 
Although the British experience suggests limits on what legal 
reform can do to encourage institutional oversight in the United 
States, it also suggests that some feared dangers of greater institu-
tional oversight are exaggerated. For example, we find no evidence 
that British institutions "micro-manage," meddle in day-to-day 
business decisions, collude with each other to take advantage of mi-
nority shareholders, foment price-fixing conspiracies, use their in-
fluence to extract special concessions from corporations, or 
intervene in well-run firms. On the contrary, institutional attention 
is a scarce resource that is allocated mostly to problem firms. 
The British experience also reinforces the danger of generaliz-
ing about institutional investors. We need to understand each type 
of institution separately, to assess the likely degree of institutional 
involvement in corporate governance. British insurers are active, 
and British pension funds are becoming active. Yet British banks 
are uninterested in stock ownership. Although a few British mutual 
funds are active monitors, most behave more like American mutual 
funds than like British insurers. The multiplicity of institutions 
complicates the comparative inquiry and makes our conclusions 
more tentative, but there is no alternative. 
We also find signs that the internationalization of capital mar-
kets is leading to convergence in institutional investor behavjor be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom - and perhaps 
more generally. For example, some American institutions, having 
observed the common British practice of separating the positions of 
chairman and chief executive officer, are prodding American firms 
to take similar steps, with some success.14 British institutions, hav-
ing observed the prevalence of audit committees and the domi-
nance of outside directors on American boards~ are pressing for 
similar changes in British firms.15 Many British institutions are also 
13. An obvious example of how a successful first mover can influence the financial indus-
try is the success of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, & Co. and Forstmann Little & Co. in financ-
ing leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the early 1980s. The huge profits of the first movers 
inspired a number of major investment banks to enter the LBO business, which involves 
intensive oversight of managerial decisionmaking at a limited number of portfolio compa-
nies. But for most investment banks, copying proved difficult. For Drexel Burnham and 
First Boston, LBOs became a path not to profit but to huge losses. 
14. See, e.g., Gilbert Fuchsberg, Chief Executives See Their Power Shrink, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 15, 1993, at Bl. · 
15. See OXFORD ANALYTlCA LTD., BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
TRENDS IN THE G7 CoUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS 62 (1992) (describing increased 
use of nonexecutive directors by large British firms); see also infra section 11.B.4 (discussing 
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adopting the American practice of regularly voting one's shares -
and not always for management. 
Our conclusion that moderate legal deregulation will produce 
increased activism but will not - for better or worse - revolution-
ize the behavior of American financial institutions is not far from 
the conclusion that a British task force recently drew, after studying 
the United States, Japan, Germany, and France: 
[I]t is very doubtful whether the structure of the UK financial system 
could be fundamentally changed. An examination of the origins of 
systems of industrial finance shows them to be largely the product of 
historical development; and targeted Government policy has played 
only a minor role in the establishment of present day systems. Each 
country's system has developed ... [in response to] ... the historical 
and social structures of each country .... Any policy prescriptions for 
the UK must be of a kind that can be built upon the existing system of 
industrial finance.16 
The implausibility of radical change does not mean that the 
more modest change that legal reform might bring is unimportant. 
On the whole, British institutional investors are considerably more 
interested in corporate governance than most American institu-
tions. Moreover, the expectation of oversight is embedded in Brit-
ish culture. If the British system does not work flawlessly, we think 
it works better at effecting managerial changes and making boards 
of directors sensitive to shareholder desires than do current prac-
tices in the United States. Significant efficiency gains seem obtaina-
ble if American institutions were more willing to press for change at 
troubled firms, in the way that British institutions now do. 
If the British model has some advantages, how do we get there 
from here? We have relatively few answers to this critical question 
and a strong sense that institutional structures are not easily trans-
portable. Radical transformation of our financial institutions is un-
likely, even in the absence of legal restrictions. For example, the 
British banks' lack of interest in holding equities suggests that U.S. 
commercial banks, even if deregulated, would not evolve into ac-
tivist monitors. On the other hand, American public pension funds, 
mutual funds, and insurers - probably in that order of importance 
- could play a more constructive corporate governance role, and 
Britain's experience suggests that legal reforms that reduce barriers 
to institutional coalition formation would yield measurable results. 
the efforts of PRO NED, the British Committee for the Promotion of Non-Executive 
Directors). 
16. CBI {CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS.) CITY/INDUS. TASK FORCE, INVESTING 
FOR BRITAIN'S FUTURE 32 (1987) [hereinafter CBI TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
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Looking at Britain, we see a basis for tempered op'timism about 
the future of corporate governance in the United States. Institu-
tional oversight of corporate managers, both directly and indirectly 
through boards of directors,. can be improved. But, as we have sug-
gested elsewhere, a variety of legal reforms are necessary if institu-
tional oversight is to approach its potential.17 At the same time, 
shareholder oversight needs supplementation by other constraints, 
including the capital markets, tJ;ie market for corporate control, the 
incentives provided by management stock ownership, and fiduciary 
duties. Institutional oversight is no more the magic bullet that will 
solve the performance shortfalls of our major firms than takeovers 
proved to be in the 1980s. 
II. A PROFILE OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTIONAL MARKETPLACE 
We begin our study of the role of institutional investors in Brit-
ish corporate governance with a survey of the major players - the 
principal institutions, industry trade groups, and other bodies who 
define the corporate governan~e landscape. We note, however, an 
important caveat. Even more than in the United States, institu-
tional investors in Britain overlap conventional categories. There, 
as here, mutual funds and insurer~ manage substantial pension as-
sets. Moreover, Britain has few ofthe.regulatory firewalls that, in 
the United States, separate mutual funds from insurers and com-
mercial banks, and commercial banks from investment banks. In-
surers often run a separate mutual fund business and vice versa; 
most commercial banks have investment baJ?.king subsidiaries. 
A. The Institutions 
British firms, like their U.S. and Japanese counterparts, have 
undergone a tremendous shift since World War II from individual 
ownership of shares to institutional ownership. As late as 1957, 
British financial institutions held only 18% of all British common 
stock (ordinary shares in British parlance); this had grown to 60% 
by 1980 and has remained roughly constant since then. Foreign 
holdings, which are another 13 % of the market, are also largely in-
17. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 813 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Corporate Governance 
Reform: 13D Rules and Control Person Liability, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Winter 1993, at 49; 
Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CoRP. L. 1 (1992); Black (1990), supra 
note 2; Coffee (1994), supra note 4; Coffee (1991), supra note 3. 
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stitutional holdings. A breakdown by type of institution is shown in 
Table 1.18 
TABLE 1 
OWNERSHIP OF BRITISH EQUITIES, 1963-1992 
Percentage Ownership 
Type of Shareholder Dec. 31, 1963 Dec. 31, 1981 Jan. 1, 1992 
Insurers 10.0 20.5 20.7 
Pension Funds 6.4 26.7 31.1 
Mutual Funds 1.3 3.6 5.7 
Other Financial Institutions 11.3 6.8 2.8 
Banks 1.3 0.3 0.2 
All U.K. Financial Institutions 30.3 57.9 60.5 
Nonfinancial Companies 5.1 5.1 3.3 
Foreign 7.0 3.6 12.8 
Non-Profit Entities 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Government 1.5 3.0 1.2 
Individuals 54.0 28.2 20.0 
Below we describe each major type of institution and its share 
of the total equity market. It is easiest to begin with a scorecard. 
As of mid-1991, the twenty-five largest institutional investors 
were:19 
18. Table 1 is adapted from 1992 SHARE REGISTER SURVEY, supra note 9. Other data 
sources include RICHARD J. BRISTON & RICHARD DOBBINS, THE GROWTH AND IMPACI' OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 139 exh. 13 (Institute of Chartered Accountants 1978) (reporting 
1957-1970 data); Erik Berglof, Capital Structure as a Mechanism of Control: A Comparison 
of Financial Systems, in THE FIRM AS A NExus OF TREATIES 237, 249 (Masahiko Aoki, Bo 
Gustafsson & Oliver Williamson eds., 1990) (reporting London Stock Exchange data for 
1980). For Japanese data, see JAPAN SECURITIES REsEARCH INST., SECURITIES MARKET IN 
JAPAN 1992, at 68 tbl. 9 (1992) (reporting that individual ownership declined from 61 % in 
1950 to 23% in 1989, while financial institution ownership grew from 24.5% to 48%). 
19. See Fiona Walsh, Sweeping Out the Boardrooms, SUNDAY TIMES (London), June 16, 
1991, § 4, at 9. 
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TABLE 2 





























Mercury Asset Management 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd 
Robert Fleming Holdings 
Invesco MIM 
Schroder Investment Mgmt. 
Standard Life 
Postel Investment Mgmt. 
Lloyds Bank 
Baring Investment Mgmt. 
Commercial Union 
Midland Montagu Asset Mgmt. 
Norwich Union Life Insurance 
Legal & General 
Royal Insurance 
NM Rothschild Asset Mgmt. 
County Investment Mgmt. 
Friends Provident Life 
Natl. Coal Board Pension Fund 
Scottish Widows Fund & Life 
Guardian Royal Exchange 
Eagle Star Holdings 
Sun Alliance 
Kleinwort Benson Inv. Mgmt. 























































The central message from Table 2 is that the structure of institu-
tional investment in the United Kingdom rests on retirement sav-
ings. Most of the merchant banks and investment managers listed 
above principally manage pension money. Only two of the ten larg-
est firms are insurance companies - and insurers also manage pen-
sion accounts and sell investment products designed for retirement 
savings. 
1. Insurance Companies 
British insurers, like Japanese and German insurers,2° hold large 
equity positions for their own account. In 1989, for example, Brit-
ish insurers held common stock with a market value equal to 23 % 
20. Japanese insurers held 17.3 % of all Japanese equities in 1990, an insignificant change 
from 17.5% in 1981. Jun Shirota, Why was the Japanese Stock Price Level High in the mid 
1980s?: A Money Supply Hypothesis, 182 SHOKEN KEIZAI, Dec. 1992, at 27, 39 tbl. 4. Ger-
man insurers held 10.6% of German equities in 1990. Kester (1992), supra note 7, at 90. On 
the large equity holdings of Allianz A.G. Holding, Germany's largest insurer, see David Wal-
ler, Allianz disclosure helps clear fog, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at 24. 
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of their total assets, a percentage that has fluctuated with market 
prices but otherwise shown no apparent trend since 1965.21 Insur-
ance companies· 1ong were the. largest single type of British institu-
tion in terms of their equity holqings; they are now second in size to 
pension funds. As Table 1 shows, insurers' share of all equities has 
grown, from 10% in 1963 to 21 % in 1992. But pension fund hold-
ings have grown even faster, from 6% in 1963 to 31 % in 1992. 
The prominent role of British insurers is in sharp contrast to 
that of American insurers. In 1990, the twenty largest American 
life insurers had only 3.6% of their "common account" assets -
assets held for the insurer's own account - in common and pre-
ferred stock.22 As a result, in 1992, American insurance companies 
- life insurers and property/casualty insurers combined - held 
only 2.4 % of American equities.23 
In addition to their direct holdings, British insurers, like their 
American counterparts, manage large amounts of pension assets, 
though we lack good data on exactly how much. British insurers 
were once the dominant managers of pension assets.24 But, as Ta-
ble 2 shows, they have lost market share to merchant banks and 
independent money managers. British insurers also manage mutual 
funds, a business denied to American insurers by law.25 Once 
again, we lack data on the size of insurers' mutual fund business. 
21. See BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), supra note 18, at 127 exh. SB, 128 exh. 7 (reporting 
that between 1966 and 1975, insurer holdings of common stock varied between 20% and 27% 
of assets measured at book value and between 14% and 44% of assets measured at market 
value; 1975 market value share is 26%); CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATIS· 
TICS 89-90 tbl. 7.10 (Dec. 1991} (reporting data for 1988 and 1989); CENTRAL OFFICE OP 
INFO., REFERENCE p AMPHLET No. 133, INSURANCE IN BRITAIN 23 {1979} [hereinafter INSUR· 
ANCE IN BRITAIN] (reporting that 29% of insurer assets were invested in common stock in 
1977, based on book value). 
22. See Carolyn K. Brancato, Institutional Investorli: A Widely Diverse Presence in Cor-
porate Governance tbl. 9 (Feb. 25, 1993) (working draft, Columbia Univ. School of Law Ctr. 
for Law & Economic Studies, Columbia Institutional Investor Project). There are some in-
consistencies in Brancato's data. She reports that the entire life insurance industry held 9.1 % 
of its assets in common and preferred stock in 1990. This percentage is far higher than the 
3.6% average for the top 20. Yet the top 20 insurers held over half of all industry assets. Our 
judgment is that the top-20 figure, which is derived from company-by-company data, is more 
likely to be accurate and that the higher percentages for the entire industry probably include 
some managed assets. The British data could suffer from similar confusion between direct 
and managed holdings. The data in Table 2 includes managed holdings. 
23. See Financial Assets & Equity Holdings {1993), supra note 9, at 47. 
24. See LESLIE HANNAH, INVENTING RETIREMENT: THE DEVELOPMENT OP 0CCUPA· 
TIONAL PENSIONS IN BRITAIN 73 (1986) (reporting that insurers had "built up a commanding 
market lead" in pension fund management in the 1950s, but thereafter suffered "increasingly 
tough competition" from a new "specialist pension profession" that could handle the admin-
istrative details and a new "investment management" profession that could manage the 
funds}. 
25. See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1469, 1471-78 {1991}. 
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The British insurance industry is highly concentrated. Pruden-
tial, the single largest British institutional investor, owns over 3.5% 
of the entire British stock market.26 This ·dwarfs U.S. institutions, 
the largest of which manages under 1.5% of all equities (with voting 
power even lower). Indeed, in percentage terms, the largest Ameri-
can institutions would not even make the British top ten.27 
A closer look at Prudential conveys a better sense of the moni-
toring capability of tQese large institutional investors. Prudential 
Portfolio Managers Limited (PPM), Prudential's principal invest-
ment subsidiary, manages a total portfolio of £45 billion, half of 
which is held for external clients - chiefly pension funds. Of this 
portfolio, 43% (£19 billion) is invested in U.K. equities. PPM esti-
mated for us that at any one time it held approximately 900 U.K. 
stocks. Its holdings included "virtually pvery" corporation in the 
100 largest British corporations, a group that accounts for 70% of 
the capitalization of the :British stock market. PPM commonly 
holds a substantial stake in even the largest British corporations. 
PPM estimated for us that it held a 5% or greater stake in "proba-
bly 200 companies." When we asked how high they would go in 
percentage ownership, its senior management acknowledged that it 
"gets cautious at 10%," but currently held stakes of up to 14%. 
Concern about illiquidity - being "locked in" in its parlance -
was the principal reason expressed for usually stopping at or near 
10%. 
One plausible reason why British, Japanese, and German insur-
ers hold more common stock than American insurers is that Ameri-
can insurance regulation long forbade, and continues to restrict, 
American insurers from holding large equity stakes.28 The British 
have nothing comparable. Instead, the British system is based on 
" 'freedom with publicity' - freedom for the insurers to determine 
their own ... investment and other policies in return for publicity 
about their financial condition."29 Government Actuary's Depart-
ment regulations require that an insurer's assets, valued at market, 
equal 104 % of liabilities. Insurers must meet this test assuming a 
25% fall in equity values. But equities are not disadvantaged com-
pared to other risky investments. The 104 % test must also be met 
assuming a 25% fall in the value of real estate holdings and a 3% 
26. See Artus (1990), supra note 11, at 12. 
27. For a survey of the largest American institutional investors, see II 300: America's Top 
Money Managers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1993, at 105. 
28. See Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the 
Insurance Industry, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 639 (1993). 
29. INSURANCE IN BRITAIN (1979), supra note 21, at 37. 
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rise in interest rates (which will reduce bond values). Moreover, 
regulators have been flexible in market downturns. They infor-
mally relaxed the 25% test in mid-1992 when a bear market 
brought some insurers close to regulatory minimums, so that the 
insurers would not have to dump stocks to meet the solvency test.30 
British insurers are, on the whole, long-term investors. The an-
nual turnover rate for life insurers was roughly 15% per year in 
1986, and was below 10% as recently as 1980.31 In contrast, the 
average U.S. institutional investor turns over its portfolio nearly 
once per year.32 Only a limited number of heavily indexed U.S. 
pension funds and a few exceptional U.S. money managers have 
turnover rates as low as the typical British insurer.33 Moreover, 
British insurers rarely sell a major position completely. If Pruden-
tial or Legal & General Group PLC, another large British insurer, 
is a major shareholder today, it will probably remain so for the fore-
seeable future. Thus, British firms know that such a shareholder is 
a more or less permanent monitor. 
2. Pension Funds 
In Britain, as in the United States, pension funds have become 
the largest single category of institutional investor, soaring from 3% 
of the market in 1957 to 31 % in 1992.34 Both the United States and 
Britain have large corporate pension plans, fueled by legal require-
ments for minimum funding and tax exemption for pension bene-
fits. The British have no strict analogue to our multiemployer 
pension funds, nor to our public pension funds. Most public em-
30. See Norma Cohen, New ratios offer a reprieve to equities: The effect of relaxing port· 
folio margins, Fm. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at 4. British insurers are also subject to European 
Co=unity minimum capital rules, but the regulations are not unduly strict. So far as we can 
tell, co=on stock, valued at book value, counts toward the required minimum capital in the 
same way as any other asset. The book value approach increases insurers' ability to hold 
co=on stock. They will not violate the solvency rules simply because equity prices have 
dropped, as long as prices recover before the stock must be sold or losses can be offset by 
also taking profits on other holdings. For an overview of EC insurance regulation, see INSUR· 
ANCE IN BRITAIN (1979), supra note 21, at 41. 
31. See CBI TASK FoRCE REPORT (1987), supra note 16, at 22. 
32. See Louis LoWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT·TERM GAIN 
AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 63-68 (1988) (noting an average annual turnover of 87% 
for all U.S. equities, with institutional turnover higher still). 
33. See, e.g., Dale M. Hanson, The Long-Term Perspective: One Institutional Investor's 
Point of View, Address at the Current Investment Issues Seminar (Sept. 23, 1992) (transcript 
on file with authors) (reporting that CalPERS has annual turnover of about 10% for the 80% 
of its portfolio that is indexed). Note, however, that if the nonindexed 20% of CalPERS' 
equity portfolio turns over at 100% per year, CalPERS total turnover would still be 28% 
[(0.10 x 0.80) + {1.00 x 0.20) =· 0.28]. 
34. For 1957 data, see BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), supra note 18, at 139 exh. 13. For 
1992 data, see Table 1. 
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ployee pensions are unfunded. The principal British analogues to 
American public pension funds are the large quasi-public plans cov-
ering the employees of formerly nationalized industries, such as the 
£20 billion coal miners' plan run by CIN Management and the Post 
Office and British Telecommunications pension funds, which total 
£32 billion and are administered by Postel Investment Manage-
ment. In 1980, quasi-public plans held about 29% of all pension 
plan assets, suggesting that they currently hold about 9% of British 
equities.35 In contrast, Germany and Japan have minimal pension 
fund assets.36 
a. Corporate pension plans. Apart from funding rules, British 
pension plans have been relatively unregulated. Pension plans are 
set up as trusts, with the trustees governed principally by the com-
mon law of trusts. This lets company officers pick the pension plan 
trustees. Often, as in the United States, they pick themselves. Brit-
ish pension plans use a mixture of inside and outside money manag-
ers. The trend, though, is in the direction of outside managers, as 
suggested by the dominance of pension fund managers among the 
largest investors.37 
Corporate pension plans in Britain, like their American coun-
terparts, are relatively passive. But their passivity is not absolute. 
Outside money managers face a tension between maximizing re-
turns and a conflict-of-interest-driven desire to keep a low profile 
with regard to shareholder activism. Faced with a bad investment, 
they may quietly support another major shareholder that takes the 
lead role in pressing for a change in strategy or management, hap-
pily sell their shares to a takeover bidder, or take joint action that 
they would not take individually, perhaps through the industry 
35. See RICHARD L. DEATON, THE PoLmCAL EcoNoMY OF PENSIONS: PoWER, PoLmcs 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CANADA, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 242 {1989). 
36. In Germany, high government-funded retirement benefits leave less need for corpo-
rate pension plans. The government plans are not funded. See Buxbaum {1991), supra note 
7, at 10. Until recently, most Japanese corporate pensions were unfunded. Recently adopted 
funding requirements, however, imply that Japanese pension plans will become important 
over the next couple of decades. Conversation with Dr. Hiroo Hojo, Senior Economist, Ja-
pan Securities Research Institute {Feb. 26, 1993). We are not aware of data on the size of 
funded Japanese pension plans. Cf. JAPAN SECURmES RESEARCH INST. {1992), supra note 
18, at 8-9 (not treating pension funds as a separate type of financial institution). Funded 
pension trusts administered by banks held an estimated 0.9% of Japanese equities in 1989. 
Id. at 10 tbl. 3. 
37. The relatively unregulated state of British pension plans will likely change in the 
wake of the Robert Maxwell scandal, in which Maxwell looted corporate pension plans to 
fund his firms' operating losses. See, e.g., Bronwen Maddox, Like a thief taking $2B in the 
night, Fm. PoST, June 17, 1992, § 1at6. Some proposals, such as making at least some of the 
trustees independent of the plan sponsor, see Protecting Pensions, EcoNOMIST, Nov. 14, 1992, 
at 15, will increase the fund's independence and may lead to pension plans' becoming more 
active in corporate governance issues. 
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trade group, the National Association of Pension Funds, Ltd. 
(NAPF). In some cases, outsiCle money managers will urge a 
change behind the scenes, a rarity in the United States.38 
b. Quasi-public pension plans. In the United States, public 
pension plans, and quasi-public plans like the College Retirement 
Equities Fund (CREF), have been by far the most active institu-
tions in the corporate governance realm.39 The incentives of public 
fund managers to be active monitors of corporate managers remain 
uncertain. Public fund managers have weaker conflicts of interest 
than other institutions in opposing corporate managers. But their 
incentives to monitor corporate managers are limited. Public fund 
managers do not directly profit if the fund earns a higher return. 
Many are heavily indexed, and thus will match the market whatever 
they do. Although public fund managers point to their fiduciary 
duty as the justification for their activism, some outside observers 
worry that political motives, including the desire for favorable pub-
licity, underlie some public fund activism.40 
The British example only deepens the puzzle. Traditionally, 
British quasi-public employee pension funds have not been among 
the most active shareholders. Although the Railway, Coal, and 
Postel plans have been prominent in the recent British interest in 
American-style proxy activism,41.they are less central in the behind-
the-scenes oversight that is more typical of British institutional ef-
forts to date.42 • 
38. See, e.g, Shareholders Taste Blood at Westinghouse, IBM, and American Express, 
CoRP. CoNTROL ALERT {American Lawyer Media, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1993, at 1, 4 
("[P]rivate money managers ... made a rare appearance ••. when James Robinson tried to 
hang on as chairman of the board of [American Express] .... "). 
39. See generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Govern· 
ance Reconsidered, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 795 {1993). 
40. For discussion of the incentives and motives of American public fund managers, see, 
for example, WILLIAM M. O'BARR & JoHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE 
WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 175·205 {1992); Black (1992), supra 
note 17, at 878-81; Coffee {1994), supra note 4, at 857-71; Romano {1993), supra note 39. 
41. Telephone Conversation with Howard Sherman, Director, Institutional Shareholder 
Services' Global Proxy Advisory Service (Mar. 25, 1993); see Richard A. Melcher & Patrick 
Oster, Yankee-Style Activists Strike Boardroom Terror Abroad, Bus. WK., Mar. 15, 1993, at 
74, 75 {Alastair Ross Goobey, CEO of Postel Investment Management, explains: "We see 
ourselves playing a policeman's role."); Margaret Price, Governance Efforts Expanding to 
U.K., PENSIONS & INvESTMENTS, Sept. 30, 1991, at 3, 31 (noting that South Yorkshire Pen-
sions Authority Superannuation Fund joined a campaign to force Fisons PLC, a chemical and 
fertilizer manufacturer, to change its method of peat harvesting in Yorkshire). 
42. Our interviews with the two la.rgest quasi-public pension advisers - Postel and CIN 
Management, which manages the British Coal Pension Funds - suggest that they are eager 
to join and form shareholder coalitions. If they choose to use it, British quasi-public funds 
should have significant influence. The Postel plan, for example, is larger in relative terms 
than any U.S. public fund. See Melcher & Oster {1993), supra note 41, at 75. 
June 1994] Institutional Investor Behavior in the U.K. 2015 
3. Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are the third major British category of institu-
tional investor. British "investment trusts" and "unit trusts" corre-
spond roughly to American closed-end and open-end mutual funds, 
respectively. The two together owned an estimated 11 % of British 
equities in 1990, up from about 6% ill 1957, though not much 
changed since 1972.43 This is siinilar to American mutual funds, 
which owned an estimated 10% of U.S. equities in 1993.44 In con-
trast, Japanese and German mutual funds are unimportant as insti-
tutional shareholders.45 
There are sharp differences between mutual funds in their in-
volvement in corporate governance. Many British mutual funds are 
largely passive. On the other hand, M&G Group, which is princi-
pally a unit trust manager, is sometimes held out as a model of mu-
tual fund behavior. In 1992, M&G held 5% or greater stakes·in 250 
public companies.46 M&G explains that its corporate philosophy 
includes long-term investing and active dialogue with corporate 
managers: 
We believe strongly that, as an institutional investor, we should have a 
constructive dialogue with the management of companies in which we 
have a significant interest . . . . We take a long term view of perfor-
mance and we are not deflected by short term considerations. We do 
not attempt to tell management how to run their businesses, but, if a 
company's actions seem likely to jeopardise the interests of share-
holders, we find that constructive intervention can often be preferable 
to disposing of our holding.47 
In an interview with us, a senior M&G official estimated that it 
saw the typical company in its portfolio two to three times a year. 
Still, because M&G holds roughly 700 stocks, it can scarcely moni-
tor each portfolio company with probing intensity. Unlike other 
respondents in our interviews, M&G told us that it seldom joins a 
coalition with other investors. It limits itself to one-to-one discus-
43. For 1957 and 1972 data, see BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), supra note 18, at 139 exh. 13, 
144 exh. 20. For 1990-1991 data, see Kester (1992), supra note 7, at 90. We are not sure why 
the recent Share Register Survey, reported in Table 1, reports mutual fund ownership of only 
6%, and suspect that some mutual fund assets are hidden within other categories in Table 1. 
44. See Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 
75, 76 n.1 (1993) (reporting Federal Reserve data). 
45. Open- and closed-end investment trusts held 3.7% of Japanese equities in 1989. JA-
PAN SECURmES RESEARCH INST. (1992), supra note 18, at 10. This is far less than Japanese 
banks and insurers. Germany has no significant mutual fund industry, apart from the trust 
business conducted by the German universal banks. 
46. See M&G GROUP PLC, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT AND AccouNTS 3 (1992) [hereinafter 
M&G 1992 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
47. Id. 
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sions. This may partly reflect M&G's tendency to invest in smaller 
companies, in which M&G typically is a very influential share-
holder. Thus, M&G may not need to find other institutional allies. 
British mutual funds trade less actively than their American 
counterparts but far more actively than other British institutions. 
In 1986, mutual fund turnover averaged about 40%, compared to 
less than 20% for insurers and pension funds.48 Mutual fund man-
agers also report that they compete intensely over relative perform-
ance records. The instinct of many mutual fund managers is to sell 
their shares in a troubled firm, rather than try to turn it around. 
Still, as in the United States, passivity is relative, not absolute, even 
for trading-oriented funds. Mutual fund managers, like pension 
fund managers, occasionally press for corporate change in a clear 
case.49 
4. Commercial Banks 
British commercial banks are like American commercial banks, 
and unlike German and Japanese banks, in that they hold little 
stock directly. As Table 1 shows, banks hold only 0.2% of British 
equities. This compares with 0.3 % ownership of American equities 
· by American banks in 1990-1991.so 
Current regulation cannot explain the passivity of British banks. 
From World War II until the late 1970s, the Bank of England did 
not count equity holdings as part of the bank's required regulatory 
capital. But this policy was substantially relaxed in the late 1970s. 
Yet the banks seem uninterested in holding equity - for which we 
offer a multicausal explanation in Part V. 
American banks, though they hold little stock directly, are ma-
jor holders as trustees for wealthy individuals. Bank trusts held 
7.3% of all American equities.in 1992, though they are usually pas-
48. See CBI TASK FORCE REPORT {1987), supra note 16, at 22. 
49. For U.S. examples, see Alison L. Cowan, Investors' Power Test at Borden, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 1993, at Dl; Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Activist Holders: Giant Investors 
Flex Their Muscles More at U.S. Corporations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1992, at Al, A6 
(describing efforts by John Neff of Windsor Fund to convince Chrysler directors to find a new 
CEO to replace Lee Iacocca). For a U.K. example, see John Gapper & Norma Cohen, A 
tour of investors buys time for the bank, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at 19 (A mutual fund 
head, having met with Barclays' CEO, explains: "I got the feeling he realises the level of 
dissatisfaction."). 
50. See Kester {1992), supra note 7, at 90. 
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sive investors.51 In contrast, bank trust holdings are not even sepa-
rately listed in Britain.52 
Tue failure of British banks to utilize their legal authority to 
hold equity is more striking because their merchant banking affili-
ates are among the largest pension fund managers. British com-
mercial banks seemingly could combine their holdings as pension 
fund managers with direct investments in order to wield influence 
disproportionate to the size of their direct equity stakes. In Ger-
many, a few large banks effectively control many firms through a 
combination of direct holdings, stock held as a nominee for individ-
uals, and mutual fund holdings. In Britain, this synergy has been 
exploited by insurers but not by commercial banks. 
5. Investment Banks 
British investment banks - "merchant banks" in the British 
phrase - like their U.S. counterparts, hold little equity for their 
own account but hold substantial stock as nominees for other hold-
ers, principally individuals. British merchant banks also manage 
substantial mutual fund and .pension assets. 
British investment banks have been more active in corporate 
governance than their almost completely passive American coun-
terparts. As we discuss in Part IV, some merchant banks partici-
pate in institutional coalitions and occasionally lead them. But, at 
the same time, British investment banks play a much less prominent 
role than insurers. As with commercial banks, multiple factors, ex-
plored in Part V, interact to explain the degree of interest shown by 
investment banks in corporate governance. 
B. Self-Regulatory Organizations 
The second central pillar of informal oversight, British style, is 
self-regulation through trade associations associated with each ma-
jor type of institution, plus committees and organizations that are 
set up from time to time. Often these committees are joint projects 
between the "City" - the British term for financial institutions of 
all types, many of which are located in a small district in the City of 
51. Financial Assets & Equity Holdings, (1993), supra note 9, at 47. 
52. Some of the gap may be filled by the 2.4% of equities held in 1975 by "financial 
companies other than banks, insurers, and mutual funds." See BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), 
supra note 18, at 147 exh. 22A. Perhaps, too, some trust holdings by banks are captured 
under the catchall phrases "persons, executors, and trustees" or "other shareholders." See id. 
at 139 exh. 13, 141-46 exh. 16-22. 
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London - and British industry. We describe below the principal 
trade organizations and cmnmittees.53 
1. Industry Trade Organizations 
Each type of British financial institution (except commercial 
banks) has its own trade organization - the Association of British 
Insurers (AB!), the Institutional Fund Managers' Association 
(IFMA), the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the 
Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC), the Associa-
tion of Unit Trust and Investment Funds (AUTIF), and the British 
Merchant Banking and Securities Houses Association (BMBA). 
The trade organizations serve the classic lobbying function that one 
might expect, but they also serve as a nexus for corporate govern-
ance activity. 
The AB!, the NAPF, and the IFMA have each been active in 
recent debates over corporate governance. The AB! has long 
fought to preserve preemptive rights and has served as the forum 
for "case~committees." Historically, the case committee was proba-
bly the most important low-visibility institution for negotiations be-
tween institutional shareholders and corporate managers.54 When 
a public corporation neared insolvency or faced some other long-
term crisis, the AB! would assist in forming a committee of the in-
surance companies holding the largest stakes in the firm to meet 
with its board and typically negotiate changes in management. 
Membership on the case committee was usually kept nonpublic, as 
was the committee's existence, because its formation would cast 
doubt on the corporation's solvency and could depress the stock 
price if publicized. The committee members understood them-
selves to be barred from trading the corporation's securities, per-
haps because this could be viewed as insider trading. More 
recently, the NAPF has also formed case committees of pension 
funds. 
The case committee has declined in importance in recent years, 
and most of our interviewees were skeptical about its contemporary 
utility. Typically, case committees were viewed as "unwieldly," hav-
ing too many members to act quickly or decisively. Today, a firm's 
53. This section discusses the self-regulatory organizations that are important for corpo-
rate governance issues. In addition, various self-regulatory organizations, created by the Fi-
nancial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, reprinted in main in 30 HALSBURY's STATUTES OP 
ENGLAND AND w ALES 162 (4th ed. reissue 1991 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter HALSBURY's 
STAT.], regulate financial institutions but have not yet played a significant corporate govern-
ance role. See section 111.B. 
54. See Davies (1994), supra note 8, at 273-74. 
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largest shareholders, when they intervene, are more likely to form a 
loose coalition on their own than to set up a case committee 
through the ABI or the NAPF. Also, some institutions might not 
want to join a case committee as this would restrict their ability to 
sell. Finally, a committee of only insurance companies or pension 
funds cannot speak for all institutional investors, yet a pan-institu-
tional committee would be even more unwieldy. Nonetheless, our 
interviewees estimated that roughly two to four case committees 
are still formed each year. 
The NAPF and the IFMA have concentrated much of their at-
tention on encouraging shareholder voting. The IFMA, now 
chaired by Paddy Linaker, the chief executive of M&G, recently 
urged that institutions always vote shares held in a fiduciary capac-
ity. ss The NAPF has also developed model proxy forms that clearly 
authorize the fund manager to vote the pension fund's shares. At 
present, whether the pension trustees have delegated voting power 
to the fund manager is often unclear, even to the parties involved. 
In addition, the NAPF has established a proxy voting service to 
provide information on specific contests, without recommendations, 
to its members.s6 Both the NAPF and the ABI have also prepared 
guidelines regarding executive pay, the length of directors' con-
tracts, and other corporate governance issues. Beyond forming 
case committees, neither the ABI nor the NAPF becomes involved 
in disputes at specific companies. Their activity level also depends 
on the identity of their frequently rotating chairmen. 
2. The Institutional Shareholders' Committee 
In addition to these individual trade organizations, an umbrella 
organization, the Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC), rep-
resents all major financial institutions except commercial banks.s7 
The ISC was originally formed in 1973 at the behest of the Bank of 
England.SB It became moribund by the late 1970s, but was revived 
in the 1980s. In theory, the ISC can wield more power than any one 
shareholder or trade group. In practice, "the individual cases in 
55. The IFMA recommended that its members vote their shares at a time when only 20% 
of pension fund shares were voted at annual meetings. See British corporate governance: 
Punters' progress, EcoNOMIST, Sept. 7, 1991, at 86 (hereinafter Punters' progress]. 
56. See Norma Cohen, Survey of Pension Fund Investment, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at 8, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, F1ntme File. 
57. The ISC's members are the ABI, the AITC, the BMBA, the NAPF, and the AUTIF. 
58. See RICHARD DOBBINS & THOMAS W. McRAE, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND 
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 5-6 (1975). 
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which it intervened in regard to the composition of the board have 
been few and far between."59 
When the !SC was revived in the late 1980s, its then-chairman, 
Donald Brydon of Barclays, developed an ambitious agenda. 
Although we were unable to interview Brydon, many of our inter-
viewees commented on his bold plans for the !SC - and what hap-
pened to those plans. Uniformly described as highly successful and 
ambitious, Brydon wanted the !SC to coordinate institutional inves-
tor intervention in corporate governance disputes. He succeeded in 
moving the responsibility for forming case committees away from 
AB! and NAPF to the !SC so that one unified committee could 
represent all institutions. According to some, he envisioned an en-
hanced case committee system under which the !SC might, for ex-
ample, retain investment bankers to develop alternative business 
plans, maintain lists of acceptable non-executive directors whom 
they would seek to elect when necessary, or in a crisis obtain proxy 
authority from institutional investors. These changes would replace 
a loose-knit coalition of institutional investors with a single entity 
able to negotiate with management on a one-to-one basis. 
These changes did not come to pass. Brydon, it seems, was too 
far ahead of his constituents. In 1990, the !SC chairmanship passed 
from Brydon to Michael Sandland of Norwich Union, a leading in-
surer. As it did, the ISC's goals shifted from company-specific in-
tervention to formulating general policy positions.60 One problem 
was the expense of upgrading the !SC so that it could play an ac-
tivist role. No one was eager to pick up these costs. One insider 
told us that pension funds were reluctant to give proxies to anyone 
other than their fund managers. Others cited institutional rivalries 
within the !SC, with insurance companies being reluctant to dele-
gate power to Brydon, who WC!-S from a merchant banking back-
ground. Responsibility for forming case committees has shifted 
back to the ABI and the NAPF. The ISC's self-description cur-
rently states that it "seeks to identify areas of common ground 
amongst its members and thereafter to promulgate those jointly 
held views. It does not normally become involved in matters con-
cerned with particular investments or companies."61 
59. See Jonathan Charkham, Are shares just commodities?, in CREATIVE TENSION? 
{1990), supra note 11, at 34, 41. 
60. See Clare Dobie, Inside the City: Bridge between City and industry still unfinished, 
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 4, 1991, at 23. 
61. See CoMMITI'EE ON THE FINANCIAL AsPECI"S OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(CADBURY COMMITTEE), REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL AsPEcrs OP COR· 
PORATE GOVERNANCE 64 (Dec. l, 1992) [hereinafter CADBURY COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
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The brief flowering and decline of the ISC as an activist body 
suggests limited institutional capacity to undertake collective ac-
tion. There is a parallel between the ISC's limited role and the role 
played in the United States by the Council of Institutional Inves-
tors, which was recently described by its executive director as "a 
yappy dog nipping at [management's] ankles."62 The broader the 
umbrella group, the harder it is to achieve consensus, and the 
longer it takes to do so. This tends to limit such groups to address-
ing structural matters, such as board independence, that cut across 
many firms and are not time sensitive. 
The ISC's unwillingness to take company-specific actions does 
not mean that the ISC is unimportant. Its published statements 
(The Role and Duties of Directors - A Statement of Best Practice 
. and The Responsibilities of Jnstitutional Shareholders in the UK63 ) 
both express and reinforce the consensus among British institu-
tional investors that "[m]any institutions already have effective 
channels of communication with the Boards of companies in which 
they invest" and that a "direct relationship which enables directors 
and shareholders to obtain a deeper understanding of each other's 
aims and requirements" is desirable.64 At the same time, the insti-
tutions will normally support management. The ISC explains: 
"[I]nstitutional shareholders [should] support Boards by a positive 
use of their voting rights unless they have good reasons for doing 
otherwise. "65 Before casting an antimanager vote, the institution 
should first discuss the matter with management and seek an infor-
mal solution.66 
3. Corporate Governance Reform and Boards of Directors 
U.K. corporate boards are undergoing significant change. Dur-
ing the early 1980s, only around 33 % of the directors of British 
public coryorations were outside, or "non-executive." By 1989, this 
percentage had climbed to 44%, and to 50% for corporations with 
62. See Council Seeks to Expand Membership Base, INVESrOR REsP. REs. Crn., CoRP. 
GovERNANCE Buu .. , Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 15, 15. 
63. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS' COMMfITEE, THE ROLE AND DUTIES OF DIRECTORS 
- A STATEMENT OF BESr PRACTICE (1991) [hereinafter ISC, RoLE AND DUTIES OF DIREC-
TORS]; INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS' CoMMfITEE, THE REsPONSIBILmES OF INSTITU-
TIONAL SHAREHOLDERS IN THE UK (1991) [hereinafter ISC, RESPONSIBILmES OF 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS). 
64. ISC, REsPONSIBILmES OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS (1991), supra note 63, at 1. 
65. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
66. Id. 
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sales over £500 million.67 Similarly, in 1980, only 13% of U.K. pub-
lic.companies had audit committees; in 1990, this had risen to 45%. 
The percentage of public companies with a remuneration commit-
tee rose from 36% in 1980 to 62% in 1990.68 Between 1991 and 
1993, the percentage of the largest 100 British companies that had 
split the roles of chairman and chief executive officer rose from 
63% to 73%.69 
The Cadbury Committee, named after its chairman, Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, reflects the recent U.K. ferment over corporate govern-
ance. The Cadbury Committee was formed in 1991 in the wake of 
the Polly Peck scandal, in which Polly Peck, a major British firm, 
went bankrupt after years of falsifying its financial reports. The 
Committee's role, initially limited to preventing financial fraud, 
soon expanded to cover corporate governance more generally in 
the wake of the BCCI and Maxwell scandals. The Committee's 
1992 report covers both financial auditing and corporate govern-
ance and elicited controversy for its corporate governance recom-
mendations.10 Nonetheless, many of the Committee's 
recommendations are likely to be implemented in light of the sup-
port for the Committee's efforts from key institutions, including the 
Bank of England, the Confederation of British Industry, and the 
London Stock Exchange. 
The principal Cadbury recommendations are: (i) the positions 
of chairman and CEO should be separated, with the board chair-
man monitoring the performance of management; (ii) firms should 
have at least three nonexecutive directors, at least two of whom 
should have no financial or other ties with management; and (iii) 
each board should have an audit committee composed entirely of 
non-executive directors, with a majority of independent non-execu-
tive directors.71 These recommendations reflect common practice; 
the Committee wanted them to become universal. The London 
· 67. See Simon Holberton, Corporate governance: why the ideal board remains so elusive, 
FIN. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at 10. 
68. Id. 
69. See Norma Cohen, Of hats and heads, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at 10. For recent 
anecdotes, see id. (reporting that the two positions will be separated at BAT Industries); 
Norma Cohen, Marshall 'might quit' if curbed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at 5 (reporting insti-
tutional pressure on the c)l.airman and CEO of British Airways to give up one title; he 
threatened to quit instead); John Gapper & Norma Cohen, Barclays to look worldwide for 
chief executive, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at 1 (reporting that Andrew Buxton, chairman and 
CEO of Barclays Bank, gave up the CEO position "after sustained pressure from institu-
tional investors for the roles to be split"). 
70. CADBURY CoMMIITEE REPORT (1992), supra note 61; see Norma Cohen, Cadbury 
proposals prove unpalatable, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at 5. 
71. CADBURY COMMITTEE REPORT (1992), supra note 61, 'll'll 4.9, 4.11, 4.35. 
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Stock Exchange is expected to adopt rules requiring listed firms to 
disclose annually to shareholders whether they are in compliance 
with these and other elements of the Committee's Code of Best 
Practice. n 
The Cadbury Committee is representative of the British ap-
proach to corporate governance and regulation of financial institu-
tions. U.S. lawmakers might respond to a crisis by passing a new 
law or regulation. The British respond with a blue-ribbon commit-
tee that recommends changes in current practice. These recom-
mendations are usually mild, by the nature· of the committee 
process. Indeed, the Cadbury recommendations on nonexecutive 
directors and audit committees lag behind common practice in the 
United States by around a decade. In the United States, such rec-
ommendations would often be ignored. But if a high-level British 
committee recommends legal change, some legal change is likely; if 
it recommends change in private practice, some change will predict-
ably occur. 
4. PRONED 
The Committee for the Promotion of Non-Executive Directors 
(PRO NED) was established in 1982 by "the Bank of England and 
other major [financial] institutions"73 to encourage companies to 
hire more independent directors and to serve as a clearinghouse for 
director candidates. PRO NED's aims, however, are modest. For 
example, it recommends mildly that "independent Non-Executive 
Directors . . . should comprise about one-third of the Board" for 
large public companies.74 More recently, PRO NED joined the 
Cadbury Committee's recommendation that public companies 
should have audit committees composed exclusively of nonexecu-
tive directors.1s 
PRO NED's efforts may have contributed to the trend toward 
British firms' having a higher proportion of independent directors. 
72. Id. 'I 3.7. The sponsors of the Cadbury Committee expect to convene a new commit-
tee in 1995 to review the extent of voluntary compliance and to decide whether compliance 
with some recommendations should be made mandatory, perhaps by including them in Stock 
Exchange listing standards. Id. 'I 3.12. 
73. Brochure of PRO NED (Promotion of Non-Executive Directors), London, England 
(n.d., approx. 1992). 
74. PRO NED, Code of Recommended Practice on Non-Executive Directors, reprinted in 
27 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 252 (1987). 
75. See Norma Cohen, Auditing role urged for non-executive directors, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 
22, 1993, at 6. 
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Its candidate list, however, has been little used.76 Interviews with 
institutional investors elicited a common explanation. PRO NED 
directors were described to us as "good and gray," as "retired 
types," or as "not the entrepreneurial people needed on a board." 
The persons making these observations believed in the importance 
of outside directors, but not in PRO NED's ability to attract the 
needed personnel. 
Ill. FORMAL AND INFORMAL REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONAL 
BEHAVIOR 
A. British Company Law 
Corporate law provides a base for institutional exercise of 
power, by specifying corporate actions that require shareholder 
consent. British company law is generally similar to U.S. corporate 
law on voting rules and matters put to shareholder vote.77 Most of 
the constraints on British managers are found outside the company 
law. For example, the company law allows dual class voting struc-
tures, but the institutions oppose them with sufficient vigor that 
new issuances of nonvoting stock are nonexistent.78 Poison pills are 
also not forbidden by company law, yet remain rare because of in-
stitutional disapproval. 
Disclosure requirements were modestly strengthened in re-
sponse to the takeover wave of the 1980s. A 1989 amendment to 
the Companies Act reduced the threshold for disclosure of major 
shareholdings to 3% from 5%.79 But the filing requirement is much 
less onerous than the comparable Schedule 13D filing for active 5% 
shareholders in the United States. Each shareholder generally files 
only for itself. Only a formal agreement triggers an obligation for a 
76. See Norma CoheQ, Passing the hat round, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 14 (reporting 
that PRO NED receives about 100 requests for names of director candidates each year, but 
only "a handful" are selected). 
77. See, e.g., Companies Act 1985 § 370, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY's STAT. (1991), supra 
note 53, at 443-44 (ordinary resolutions require approval by majority of votes cast, with mini-
mal quorum requirement); Companies Act 1985 § 378, reprinted as amended in 8 HALS· 
BURY's STAT. (1991), supra note 53, at 449-50 (extraordinary and special resolutions require 
approval by 75% of votes cast). 
78. See, e.g., LAURENCE RABINOWfIZ, WEINBERG & BLANK ON TAKE-OVERS & MERG· 
ERS § 3-805 (5th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter WEINBERG & BLANK] ("A number of 
proposals by companies to [issue] non-voting ordinary shares have been dropped following 
institutional objections, and there are no instances in recent years of a company seeking a 
listing [on the London Stock Exchange] for any new class of non-voting equity capital."). 
79. Companies Act 1989, ch. 40, § 134(2), Pun. GEN. ACTS 1989, at 2011, 2202 (codified 
at 8 HALSnuRY's STAT. (1991), supra note 53, at 288) (amending Companies Act 1985 
§ 199(2)). 
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shareholder group to aggregate its holdings;80 there is no analogue 
to the American concept of an informal "arrangement" or "under-
standing" to acquire shares as a "group."81 Critically, the disclosure 
does not include a statement of the filer's plans with respect to the 
company, and the risk that anyone will sue claiming incomplete dis-
closure is remote. 
The same political influences that led to the U.S. disclosure 
rules are also present in Britain. Corporate managers pressed for 
more extensive disclosure and for a freeze on new purchases for a 
time after a filing is made; the compromise was a required filing at a 
lower ownership level.82 Perhaps the political strength of U.K. fi-
nancial institutions shaped this compromise: If institutions are 
weak, as in the United States, strong disclosure laws that deter the 
activity being disclosed are more likely to be adopted. If institu-
tions are strong, as in Britain, the resulting disclosure rules do not 
constrain institutional action as sharply. 
In Britain, as in the United States, fear of insider-trading liabil-
ity, or of losing liquidity because one possesses inside information, 
is a significant obstacle to close communication between corporate 
managers and their major shareholders.83 The ISC explains: "Insti-
tutions do not wish to be made insiders . . . . It is important that 
such confidences are not disclosed to investors by companies . . . 
without the investors' prior consent."84 
B. Securities Industry Regulation 
The regulation of financial institutions, long largely informal, 
took a major step toward stronger formal regulation with the adop-
tion of the Financial Services Act 1986, which gave the Treasury 
Department overall responsibility for financial services regula-
80. Companies Act 1985 § 204, reprinted in 8 lIALSBURY's STAT. {1991), supra note 53, at 
292-93. 
81. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13d-3{a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3{a) (1993). 
82. For a British CEO's proposal to strengthen the disclosure rules in this manner, see Sir 
Hector Laing, The Balance of Responsibilities, in CREATIVE TENSION? (1990), supra note 11, 
at 59, 67-69. 
83. Liability for insider trading in the United Kingdom is now governed by Part V of the 
recently passed criminal Justice Act 1993. See 30 lIALSBURY's STATUTES: CuRRENT STAT-
UTES SERVICE, Money tit., at 9 {4th ed.1994) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S CURRENT STAT.]. For 
a discussion of the new act, see Keith Wotherspoon, Insider Dealing- The New Law: Part V 
of Criminal Justice Act 1993, 51 Moo. L. REv. 419 {1994). 
84. ISC, REsPONSIBILmES OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS {1991), supra note 63, at 2 
(emphasis added). In Britain, a shareholder who obtains confidential "price sensitive infor-
mation" from an insider may not trade on that information, even if the recipient has not 
agreed to keep the information confidential. Criminal Justice Act 1993 §§ 52-53, 56, re-
printed in 30 HALSBURY's CURRENT STAT. (1994), supra note 83, Money tit., at 11-13, 15. 
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tion.85 Still, the City was largely able to interpose one and some-
times two layers of self-regulatory bodies between itself and the 
Treasury Department. An umbrella self-regulator - the Securities 
Investment Board - oversees industry-specific self-regulatory bod-
ies, including the London Stock Exchange, Imro (the Investment 
Management Regulatory Organization), Lautro (the Life, Annuity, 
and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization), and Fimbra (which gov-
erns independent financial advisers).86 The future of self-regula-
tion, though, is hard to predict.. Its political legitimacy was 
weakened by the Maxwell scandal, and some major institutions, in-
cluding Prudential and National Westminster Bank, have called for 
direct government oversight.87 
C. Takeover Panel Rules 
The American debate over the pros and cons of takeovers, and 
the supposedly short-term orientation of large shareholders, was 
replayed in Britain, which experienced its own takeover wave in the 
1980s.88 The outcome of the debate, however, was very different. 
American corporate managers largely lost the academic debate on 
the merits of takeovers but won the war in the legislative trenches. 
Their already broad power to resist takeovers was broadened as 
state legislatures enacted tough antitakeover statutes and state 
courts and legislatures endorsed poison pill defenses.89 In Britain, 
defensive powers were limited to begin with and changed little over 
the decade. There simply are no poison pills, targeted share place-
ments, or lock-up options by which target managers can block a 
tender offer. The restrictive British approach to takeover defenses 
may reflect, in part, the political power of British institutions. It 
may also reflect managers' lesser power in a legal system where the 
managers lack a choice among competing jurisdictions, each eager 
for them to incorporate. 
85. Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, reprinted in 30 HALSBURY's STAT. (1991), supra 
note 53, at 162. 
86. See generally JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THREADNEEDLE STREET 
75-108 {1993). 
87. See Norma Cohen & Peter Martin, Back to the drawing-board: Financial self-regula· 
tion in the UK is facing mounting calls for reform, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1992, at 20. 
88. For pieces of the debate, see, for example, CBI TASK FORCE REPORT (1987), supra 
note 16; CREATIVE TENSION? (1990), supra note 11 (collection of essays by corporate and 
financial institution executives); PAUL MARSH, SHORT-TERMISM ON TRIAL {1990) (study 
commissioned by the IFMA). 
89. See generally Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKE· 
OVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321 (Margaret M. 
Blair ed., 1993); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA, L. 
REv. 111 (1987). 
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In Britain, the dominant source of rules governing takeovers, 
control contests, and acquisitions of large blocks of shares is the 
City Code on Take-overs and Mergers and the related Rules Gov-
erning Substantial Acquisitions of Shares, issued and periodically re-
vised by a nongovernmental body - the Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers. The City Code prohibits essentially all defensive actions 
when a takeover bid is pending or when the target has "reason to 
believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent."90 The Takeover 
Panel often issues interpretations or new rules in midcontest to han-
dle unanticipated situations. The Bank of England chooses the 
chair of the Takeover Panel; its members include representatives of 
institutional investors, public companies, and the London Stock Ex-
change.91 The Takeover Panel has no formal regulatory power, but 
its rules are universally obeyed.92 
The City Code basically bans defensive tactics during the pen-
dency of a offer, as well as preclusive pre-bid actions, such as adopt-
ing a poison pill. Once a bid is made, any defensive action requires 
shareholder approval - which will be forthcoming only when the 
shareholders would have rejected the bid anyway. At the same 
time, partial and two-tier bids are forbidden. Anyone who crosses 
the 30% ownership level must offer to buy all remaining shares at a 
uniform price.93 
The effect is that the shareholders decide whether a takeover 
bid succeeds or fails. When a firm's major shareholders are happy 
with management's performance, they will often collectively turn 
down a takeover bid, despite the short-term profit available from 
selling their shares.94 When the major shareholders are unhappy 
with management, they will be delighted to sell their shares at a 
90. PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS & MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERG-
ERS Rule 21 (1993) (listing prohibited actions); see also id. General Prine. 7 (stating that the 
target shall not take any action without shareholder approval "which could effectively result 
in any bona fide offer being frustrated"). 
91. See id. at A2 (listing the Panel's membership). 
92. The sanctions for noncompliance with the City Code include delisting by the London 
Stock Exchange, the refusal of banks and stockbrokers, who have all agreed to abide by the 
Code, to trade the company's shares, and the likely revolt of institutional shareholders at the 
next general meeting. 
93. See PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS & MERGERS (1993), supra note 90, Rule 9.1. For an 
overview of British takeover regulation, see Deborah A. DeMott, Comparative Dimensions 
of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 93-99 (1987). 
94. See TRADE & INDUSTRY CoMMITrEE, HousE OF CoMMONs, TAKEOVERS AND MERG-
ERS: MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1990-1991 Sess. 278 (1991) [hereinafter TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS] (testimony of Michael Sandland of Norwich Union); Artus (1990), supra note 11, 
at 13. 
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premium to market, and there is little that the managers can do to 
stop them. 
D. Stock Exchange Rules and Preemption Guidelines 
A further source of nongovernmental regulation is the London 
Stock Exchange's listing rules and guidelines for listed companies. 
The rules are binding on all listed companies. These include obliga-
tions to comply with the City Code, to follow prescribed procedures 
for proxy voting at shareholder meetings, and to seek shareholder 
approval to disapply preemptive rights (which is needed under 
company law) only for the interval between annual shareholder 
meetings.9s 
In addition, the London Stock Exchange publishes various 
guidelines, of which the most important are the Pre-emption Guide-
lines. The Pre-emption Guidelines were developed in the late 1980s 
by a joint industry-City-London Stock Exchange group called the 
Pre-emption Group and are discussed below.96 The guidelines are 
only advisory but have the same practical effect as formal rules for 
large companies, who would face a shareholder revolt if they did 
not follow the guidelines. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: 
WHAT DOES AND DOES NOT HAPPEN 
The extent of collective action undertaken by British institu-
tional investors has long remained hidden, in large part because the 
institutions usually act quietly and behind the scenes. Limited 
knowledge is available from a variety of sources, including (i) prior 
academic research, (ii) publicly reported instances in which institu-
tions have challenged managements, (iii) public statements by fi-
nancial institution executives, and (iv) the available data on 
shareholder voting. Each of these is a useful but imperfect source 
of information. For example, the public statements of officials can 
be self-serving (and tend to be maddeningly vague), and the failure 
of institutional investors to vote on routine matters is not proof of 
passivity. Finally, the paucity of incidents in which institutions pub-
licly unite to oust corporate managers may demonstrate only the 
truism that the parties to any dispute tend to "bargain in the 
95. WEINBERG & BLANK (1993), supra note 78, at 8001 (reprinting LoNDON STOCK Ex. 
CHANGE, ADMISSIONS OF SECURITIES TO LISTING (1991)). 
96. See infra section IV.C.2. 
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shadow of the law" and s_eldom proceed to the end game stage of a 
public dispute resolved by shareholder vote. 
Given these problems, in-depth interviews with institutional in-
vestors seemed a largely missing and important source of evidence. 
During the summer of 1992, one of us (Coffee) visited London and 
conducted prearranged interviews with senior executives at a repre-
sentative sample of leading insurance companies, mutual funds, 
pension money managers and self-regulatory organizations. These 
interviews focused on the extent to which British institutions en-
gage in low-visibility forms of collective action and on their willing-
ness to take high-visibility actions when behind-the-scenes efforts 
are unavailing. These interviews inform our discussion in this Part 
of what British institutions do and do not do in the corporate gov-
ernance realm. 
We begin with a review of prior research in section IV.A and an 
overview of what British institutional investors say in public about 
their corporate governance role in ·section IV.B. We then tum in 
sections IV.C to IV.E to what the institutions actually do. 
A. Prior Research 
The Berle-Means thesis that shareholder dispersion implies 
weak oversight over management has long received a skeptical re-
ception among British academics. Writing in 1961, Professor Flo-
rence argued that Berle and Means had overstated managerial 
power by focusing only on the largest two or three shareholders, 
thereby ignoring the potential for collective action among a small 
group of shareholders, none of whom alone held a decisive stake.97 
Florence believed that research should focus on the twenty largest 
shareholders, who, he argued, often held enough shares to effec-
tively control even the largest British corporations.98 In 1936, the 
median proportion of voting shares held by the twenty largest 
shareholders in the eighty-two largest nonfinancial British firms was· 
about 40% - compared to 28% for a similar sample of 132 Ameri-
can corporations.99 Moreover, in 40% of the British companies, the 
twenty largest shareholders held an absolute majority of the voting 
stock, while a similar concentration existed in only 24 % of Ameri-
97. P. SARGANT FLORENCE, THE Lome OF BRmSH AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY 192 n.2 
(rev. ed. 1961). 
98. Id. at 187. 
99. Id. at 189. 
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can companies surveyed.100 The table below summarizes Florence's 
data: 
TABLE 3 
SHARES IN LARGE U.K. FIRMS HELD BY TWENTY 
LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS IN 1936 
Percentage Held Number of Firms % 
0·9.9% 7 9 
10-19.9% 11 13 
20-39.9% 17 21 
3049.9% 14 17 
50% and up 33 40 
TOTALS 82 100 
In 1986, John Scott, a sociologist, reexamined Florence's hy-
pothesis that a loose-knit coalition of twenty or so shareholders 
could potentially control most large British corporations.101 Scott's 
data, from a sample of 100 of the 250 largest financial and nonfinan-
cial companies in 1977, showed that ownership concentration had 
fallen, as shown in the following table. The top twenty institutions 
never held majority control, but they typically held an influential 
20%-29% of the voting stock - a level of ownership that could 
carry control of a U.S. public corporation if held by a single 
shareholder .102 
TABLE 4 
BRITISH OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION IN 1977 
Percentage of 
Shares 
Held by Top 
20% Shareholders 





Less than 10% 
TOTALS 



























One can gain a fuller sense of the potential for collective share-
holder action in the mid-1970s by examining Scott's list of the 
twenty largest shareholders of Imperial Group, one of Britain's 
100. Id. 
101. See JoHN Scorr, CAPITALIST PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL POWER: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN (1986); see also John Scott, Corporate 
control and corporate rule: Britain in an international perspective, 41 BRIT. J. Soc. 351 (1990). 
102. Scorr (1986), supra note 101, at 95. 
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largest industrial companies at the time. We reproduce that list be-
low alongside, for comparison, a list of the twenty largest institu-
tional holders of Procter & Gamble in 1990 (P&G is representative 
of ownership concentration in the largest American firms).103 
TABLE 5 
IMPERIAL GROUP-1977 PROCTER & GAMBLE-1990 
Holding Holding 
Shareholder (%) Shareholder (%) 
Prudential Assurance 2.4 PNC Financial 1.7 
Legal & General Assurance 1.8 CalPERS 1.4 
Hill Samuel 1.4 Wells Fargo 1.0 
National Westminster Bank 1.4 Bankers Trust 1.0 
National Coal Board 1.4 Mellon Bank 1.0 
M&G Group 1.0 Rosenberg Equity Mgmt. 0.9 
Barclays Bank 0.9 MNC Financial 0.9 
Britannic Assurance 0.9 N.Y. State Pension Fund 0.9 
Royal Assurance 0.8 Star Bank, Cincinnati 0.7 
Kuwait Investment Office 0.7 N.Y. St. Teachers Pension 0.6 
Save & Prosper Group 0.7 CREF 0.6 
Cooperative Group 0.6 State Street Boston Corp. · 0.5 
Commercial Union 0.6 Texas Teachers Pension 0.5 
Norwich Union 0.5 Investors Research 0.5 
Wills family 0.5 State Street Research 0.4 
Mercury Securities 0.5 Sunbank Capital Mgmt. 0.4 
Pearl Assurance 0.4 Dodge & Cox 0.4 
Midland Bank 0.4 Cal. Teachers Pension 0.4 
General Electric 0.4 Miller, Anderson & Sherrerd 0.3 
Sun Life Assurance Society 0.4 TCW Management 0.3 
TOTAL 17.7% TOTAL 14.1 % 
For our purposes, Scott's data has several uses. First, it provides 
a benchmark. There has been a sharp increase in concentration in 
Britain compared to the level he describes as of the mid-1970s. To-
day, by one estimate, the twenty-five largest shareholders own an 
absolute majority of the shares of many publicly held British corpo-
rations.104 Second, Scott's data shows that, although much has 
changed, the players are the same. Scott found that the same insti-
tutions regularly appeared in his lists. His roster of large sharehold-
ers in 1977, ranked by the number of times they appeared in what 
he called "controlling constellations" (the top twenty shareholders 
103. Id. at 94. For Procter & Gamble data, see Carolyn K. Brancato, Institutional Inves-
tor Concentration of Economic Power: A Study of Institutional Holdings and Voting Au-
thority in U.S. Publicly Held Corporations, Part I: Top 25 U.S. Corporations as of December 
31, 1990 app. 2 (Sept. 12, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, Columbia Institutional Investor 
Project, Columbia Univ. School of Law Ctr. for Law & Economic Studies) (this data is for 
shares held with sole voting power; the total holdings by P&G's top 20 shareholders were 
18.8%). 
104. See Jackson (1991), supra note 10. 
2032 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1997 
of each company) reads like a roster of Britain's largest institutional 
investors today:105 
TABLE 6 
LARGEST BRITISH INSTITUTIONAL lNVESTORS-1977 
Institutional Investor 
Prudential Assurance 
National Coal Board 
Cooperative Group 
Legal & General Assurance 








''.Shell" Transport & Trading Pension 
National Westminster Bank 





Save & Prosper Group 
Number of Appearances 
Among Top 20 Shareholds 





















Although we lack data for the 1950s and 1960s, when institu-
tions were replacing individuals as the largest shareholders, the Flo-
rence and Scott studies suggest that ownership and control were 
never as separated in the United Kingdom as in the United States. 
British corporate managers thus may have never had the same sus-
tained opportunity to become entrenched. Concentration levels 
dipped temporarily as institutions replaced individual shareholders, 
but this was only a modest deviation from a long-run pattern of 
concentrated ownership. 
'f4e similarity of British concentration in 1977 to U.S. concen-
tration today suggests that the British experience may foreshadow 
the future course of institutional activism in U.S. corporate govern-
ance. There remain, however, important differences. In the United 
States, both legal constraints and the smaller size of U.S. institu-
tions relative to the U.S. equity market make it likely that we will 
see only a gradual increase in the stakes held by the largest share-
105. Scorr (1986), supra note 101, at 100. 
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holders, rather than a quick shift to current levels of British owner-
ship concentration.106 
B. Money Manager Statements 
A second source of background information about British insti-
tutions is the public statements of British money managers. The 
general themes that emerge from these statements - themes that 
are broadly consistent with our interview evidence - are frequent 
dialogue, occasional informal intervention when a firm is in trouble, 
but only infrequent formal intervention. Both commentators and 
fund managers agree that institutions should operate behind the 
scenes whenever possible. The Institutional Shareholders' Commit-
tee explains: "The most effective action is taken quickly, and with-
out publicity."107 
As to how active the institutions are, R.E. Artus, chief invest-
ment manager of Prudential Corporation, one of the more active 
institutional investors, recently wrote: 
In any given week our senior investment managers and specialist sup-
port staff will have contact with a dozen or more companies and their 
professional advisers, concerned with the relationship between com-
panies and their shareholders, and quite distinct from the programme 
of meetings with our [security] analysts . . . . 
... [I]ntervention by shareholders does in fact occur from time to 
time, and we have been concerned with some well known instances as 
well as many more less publicised cases. But the extent of such activ-
ity by shareholders in Britain does not remotely approach the level 
where it is an effective substitute for the involvement of the banks in 
Germany or the Keiretsu system in Japan.1os 
Many British commentators wish that institutions would be 
more engaged, but few have prescriptions for how to bring this 
about. The British worry about whether the. stock market encour-
ages a short-term orientation on the part of corporate managers, 
and they envy the willingness (so they believe) of Japanese and 
106. We consider these and other likely continuing differences between the United States 
and Britain in Part VI. 
107. ISC, REsPONSIBILmES OF lNSTITUilONAL SHAREHOLDERS (1991), supra note 63, at 
3; see also TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (1991), supra note 94, at 278 (testimony of Michael 
Sandland of Norwich Union). 
108. Artus (1990), supra note 11, at 12, 14. Professor James Ball, Chairman of Legal & 
General Group PLC, states, "We are certainly not passive . . . . [W]e like to meet directly 
with the managers of a company, generally in a one to one meeting, and we like to focus on 
the strategy·of the business." James Ball, Financial Institutions and their role as shareholders, 
in CREATIVE TENSION? (1990), supra note 11, at 18, 25; see also M&G 1992 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 46, at 3 (containing the mission statement of M&G, quoted in section 
II.A.3). 
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German banks to intervene when a firm gets in trouble. A repre-
sentative statement from Jonathan Charkham, until recently the 
Bank of England's senior adviser on corporate governance matters: 
Unlike Germany and Japan, UK company management lacks both 
regular sources of sympathetic influence and, in the rare cases where 
it is essential, the stimulation of remedial action . . . . The Companies 
Acts give shareholders the necessary powers to [exercise] influence, 
but for various reasons they seldom do so.109 
Yet, to Americ~n eyes, this breast beating seems overdone. 
British institutions turn over their portfolios much more slowly than 
their American counterparts. Many of the largest British institu-
tions profess a long-term view, including willingness to turn down a 
takeover premium, and to try to change management rather than 
sell their shares. Over half of all hostile bids fail, compared to only 
about twenty percent in the United States in the days before poison 
pills. Often, the institution~ band together to support the target's 
management, and are willing to accept "a short-term fall in the bid-
dee's share price below the bid value."110 
C. The Extent of Informal Shareholder Action 
The general statements quoted in section IV.B give only limited 
insight into how often the institutions intervene in corporate affairs, 
and what institutional. investors actually do. Scott, for example, 
doubted that his "constellations" of top twenty shareholders could 
easily act "as a cohesive group."111 Rather, he concluded that their 
power lay, first, in their ability to cause the failure of "any attempt 
to raise new capital through a rights issue," and, second, in their 
power to veto a proposed restructuring if the corporation encoun-
tered financial trouble.112 This de~cription still captures much of 
the influence that institutional investors have over corporate 
managers. 
1. Protecting Shareholder Rights 
One common goal of a shareholder coalition is to protect or re-
store shareholder rights for later use. A paradigmatic example is a 
dispute that arose in the mid-1970s between institutional investors 
and Lloyds Bank over a provision in Lloyds's Articles of Associa-
109. JONATHAN CHARKHAM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND TIIE MARKET FOR COMPA· 
NIES: AsrEcrs OF TIIE SHAREHOLDERS' ROLE 7 (Bank of Eng. Discussion Paper No. 44, 
1989). 
110. Artus (1990), supra note 11, at 13. 
111. Scorr (1986), supra note 101, at 95. 
112. Id. 
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tion that capped voting rights at 500 votes per shareholder.113 This 
provision limited Lloyds's twenty largest shareholders, who collec-
tively held 16% of its stock, to voting power of only 0.01 % each. In 
1978, institutional pressure forced Lloyds to drop this provision and 
return to the normal one-share, one-vote allocation of voting 
power.114 Although twenty-odd shareholders, each holding only 
0.01 % of the voting power, obviously could not compel such a 
change, large shareholders were able to credibly threaten not to 
participate in Lloyds's subscription offerings. Similar market-based 
pressure appears to have worked in a number of other cases.11s 
The Lloyds case illustrates both the potential for and the limita-
tions on collective action by institutional investors. First, the stakes 
were high. ~ot only were basic voting rights at issue, but the issue 
was not limited to one firm. If Lloyds could limit institutions to a 
maximum number of votes, other companies would predictably fol-
low suit. In such cases, British institutions have recurrently fought. 
Institutional investors have regularly objected to attempts to issue 
nonvoting or limited voting shares. As a result, according to a lead-
ing treatise, "there are no instances in recent years of a company 
seeking a listing for any new class of non-voting equity capital."116 
Not only were the stakes high in the Lloyds case, but the cost of 
opposition was low. The beauty of a shareholder refusal to sub-
scribe to a preemptive rights offering as a strategy is that it costs 
little and forces the issuer to come to the shareholders .to negotiate, 
not the reverse. Information costs were also low. Because issues 
surrounding voting are easy to understand and are not company 
specific, shareholder coordination costs are lower than for disputes 
over business strategy or the competence of specific managers. 
These costs are further reduced by two other factors: (i) there can 
be economies of scale associated with organizing with regard to re-
curring issues; and (ii) if shareholder opposition can be coordinated 
through an industry association such as the NAPF or the AB!, the 
free-rider problem is reduced because the association's costs will be 
spread among all of its members. The minimum twenty-one-day 
period that a preemptive rights offering must remain open provides 
113. See id. at 99. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 127 n.39 (citing a case involving Peninsular & Oriental); Ian H. Fazey, Trinity 
Intl turns in £9.44m and enfranchises shareholders, F1N. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at 28; Paul L. 
Davies & Geofrey P. Stapledon, Comment on Black & Coffee, Hail Brittania?: Institutional 
Investor Behavior under Limited Regulation 2 n5 (July 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with authors) (discussing Austin Reed, Liberty, GUS). 
116. WEINBERG & BLANK (1989), supra note 78, § 3-805. 
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ample time for a number of large shareholders to coordinate their 
actions.117 
One sees preservation of shareholder rights also in what did not 
happen to takeover rules in response to the 1980s takeover wave. 
British takeover defenses were much more limited than American 
defenses when the decade began; the gap increased as American 
courts and legislatures blessed poison pills and other potent de-
fenses. British firms pushed for stricter regulation, but the institu-
tions were able to preserve the market for corporate control as a 
constraint on managerial discretion. 
2. Protecting the Preemptive Rights Weapon 
Refusal to subscribe to a preemptive rights offering has a seri-
ous theoretical weakness as a source of shareholder leverage over 
managers. British company law allows a company to seek share-
holder approval to "disapply" preemptive rights for up to five years 
at a time.118 Company law also lets companies issue rights to buy 
new shares at a very large discount to the pre-offer market value of 
their shares. A large discount forces current shareholders either to 
subscribe, sell their rights to someone else who will subscribe, or 
face severe dilution. Conversely, the smaller the discount, the more 
feasible the strategy of refusing either to subscribe or to sell one's 
rights, expecting other shareholders to act the same way. More-
over, if the discount is only a few percent, refusal to subscribe by a 
firm's largest shareholders can send a negative signal to other po-
tential investors, cause the share price to drop below the subscrip-
tion price, and thereby cause the rights offering to fail. 
Institutional investors have been zealous in defending preemp-
tive rights and the leverage they provide. In the mid-1980s, compa-
nies began to seek broad authority from shareholders to disapply 
preemptive rights for up to the maximum five-year period permit-
ted by company law, and also sought to circumvent preemptive 
rights by issuing convertible debt on terms that made conversion in 
the near future virtually certain. Institutional shareholders re-
volted. The ABI and NAPF advised their members to reject disap-
plication requests except in very narrow circumstances.119 
117. See Companies Act 1985 § 90(6), reprinted in 8 HALSBURY's STAT. (1991), supra 
note 53, at 201. 
118. See Companies Act 1985 §§ 80(4), 80(5), 95, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY's STAT. 
(1991), supra note 53, at 193, 204. 
119. For a fuller description of this controversy, see Davies & Stapledon (1993), supra 
note 115; Who's Running the Show? Why UK Institutions Are Blocking Equity Issues, Bus. 
INTL. MoNEY REP., May 11, 1987, at 146. 
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In response, the London Stock Exchange limited the disapplica-
tion period to the one-year interval between shareholders' meet-
ings. In addition, a joint industry-City-London Stock Exchange 
working group was formed, called the Pre-emption Group, which 
issued, and has since periodically revised, its Pre-emption Guide-
lines. The guidelines generally limit nonpreemptive issuances to 
5% or less of a company's share capital in any one year and 7.5% or 
less over a rolling three-year period.12° As a practical matter, the 
guidelines are binding on all public companies. Major shareholders 
will not vote for a disapplication proposal that exceeds the guide-
lines, and the major investment banks will not underwrite such an 
offering. The Pre-emption Guidelines do not limit the discount that 
a listed company can offer in a rights offering. However, compa-
nies know that if they attempt a coercive, deep discount offer, they 
are likely to face a shareholder revolt at the next annual meeting, 
and investment bankers know that a coercive rights offering will 
alienate their best customers. Thus, deep discount offers are 
rare.121 
3. CEO Replacement 
At the opposite end of a continuum from general to company-
specific issues is replacement of a poorly performing CEO. Here, 
the institutions' performance is mixed. As we discuss in more detail 
below, in a number of recent cases, institutional pressure has 
prompted a change in CEO. Even before these recent episodes, 
there was a long history of instances in which a board replaced a 
CEO in order to secure a successful subscription offering. But the 
road to CEO replacement is long and bumpy, and many institu-
tional efforts get sidetracked in various ways. The limits on institu-
tional prodding are especially evident when companies do not need 
new equity capital and therefore are less vulnerable to institutional 
refusal to subscribe to a rights offering. 
4. Board Structure and Membership 
Twenty-five years ago, British and American boards looked 
much alike. They were numerically dominated by inside directors. 
The CEO also served as board chairman, selected new directors, 
and thoroughly dominated the boardroom. Since then, both coun-
tries have moved toward greater board independence, though in 
120. LoNDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PRE-EMPTION GUIDELINES §§ 1.2, 2.1 (1987). 
121. Conversation with Jonathan Charkham, former adviser on corporate governance, 
Bank of England, in New York, N.Y. {May 5, 1994). 
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different ways. In the United States, almost all large company 
boards now have a majority of outside directors, and an increasing 
number have a majority of independent directors - directors with-
out business or family ties to the firm.122 The CEO, however, still 
usually chairs the board. 
In Britain, a large percentage of British firms, under institu-
tional prodding, have separated the jobs of CEO and chairman of 
the board, and many have assigned the role of chairman to an 
outside director. On the other hand, Britain has moved more 
slowly toward independent boards and separate audit commit-
tees.123 In Britain, as in the United States, institutional investors 
rarely sit on corporate boards themselves. 
It is not clear how much to make of these differences. Perhaps 
British institutions ar_e strong enough that they feel less need for 
majority-independent boards, as long as there are some independ-
ent directors who can be contacted in case of need. Moreover, the 
two countries are converging, as more U.S. firms appoint separate 
board chairmen and British institutions become "increasingly pre-
pared ... where necessary to encourage Boards to appoint an ade-
quate number of independent non-executive directors."124 Still, the 
prevalence of insider-dominated boards suggests that institutional 
concern with board structure was less than vigorous in the past. 
5. Voting Behavior 
In the United States, most institutions, even if they routinely 
support management, at least vote their shares. In the United 
Kingdom, most institutions historically have not voted. For exam-
ple, fewer than 20% of pension funds surveyed by the NAPP in 
1991 regularly voted.125 
It is unclear how important the lack of formal voting is. Institu-
tions do vote in proxy fights. For example, a recent proxy fight at 
Ewart produced a 96% turnout; strong institutional support ena-
bled the incumbents to defeat a dissident shareholder despite the 
dissident's 29% holding.126 Informal access to corporate executives 
and nonexecutive directors may largely obviate the need for Ameri-
122. See Black (1992), supra note 17, at 840-42. 
123. See supra section II.B.3. 
124. ISC, REsPONSIBILmES OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS (1991), supra note 63, 
at 3. 
125. See Nonna Cohen, Investors export US zeal, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1993, at 12. 
126. See Nonna Cohen, Ewart board changes blocked by institutions, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 
1992, at 8. 
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can-style shareholder proposals. Some fund managers even argue 
that they should not vote on routine matters, as this will only lull 
management into believing that the institutions support them.127 
Most of those we interviewed, however, took th~ opposite position 
- that fund managers who vote regularly created a greater impres-
sion when they withheld their votes. One said that by voting rou-
tinely and then withholding as a specific protest, he ensured that 
management would call and request his proxy, thereby creating an 
opportunity to explain his dissatisfaction. 
In general, fund managers agree that shares should be voted but 
point to logistical problems. A fund manager may serve as a fiduci-
ary for several dozen (and sometimes a hundred or more) clients 
holding a particular stock. Some may have granted proxy authority 
to the fund manager; others may not have. Moreover, the typical 
agreement between a fund manager and its pension clients giving 
the manager the power to vote the clients' shares requires the fund 
manager to first consult the client on "contentious" matters. A vote 
against management is arguably "contentious"; moreover, many 
fund managers believe that it is good client relations to consult with 
their clients before opposing management. 
Yet consulting dozens of clients is a time-consuming chore. Sev-
eral fund managers reported to us that the· intense competition 
among fund managers for pension business means that they cannot 
easily pass on the costs of voting to the client. These costs include 
not only the de minimis direct costs of voting but also the cost of 
research on voting issues and the indirect costs of client 
consultation. 
In any event, a major transition seems to be in progress in fund 
managers' attitudes towards voting. In 1991, the IFMA recom-
mended that its members should always vote their shares.12s Two 
of the largest fund managers in Britain - Robert Fleming and Phil-
lips & Drew - have adopted policies either to always vote or to 
vote whenever they hold over 1 % of the issuer's shares.129 M&G 
Group, the largest unit-trust manager, has decided to vote when-
ever it owns more than 2.5% of the company.130 Prudential, Brit-
ain's largest institutional investor, informed us, "We vote every 
127. Peter Stormonth Darling, former chairman of Mercury Asset Management, took this 
position in a 1992 interview with the Institutional Investor. See Claire Makin, Boardroom 
brawl, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1992, at 134, 139. 
128. See Punters' progress {1991), supra note 55, at 86. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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share." Thus, institutional voting is likely in the near future to be-
come the rule, rather than the exception. 
This shift could reflect the confluence of several factors: First, 
as institutional stakes become larger and subject to a greater liquid-
ity discount on sale, logic dictates that institutional shareholders 
should rely more on "voice" and less on "exit." Second, voluntary 
rules, such as the IFMA proposal, may be seen as an alternative to 
state intervention. Third, American influence may also have an im-
pact. British institutions have observed the American voting prac-
tices and also realize that if they do not vote, the votes of American 
institutions, who own a significant fraction of British equities, could 
dictate the outcome of shareholder votes. 
6. Management and Director Compensation 
British institutional investors have begun to address the difficult 
task of establishing optimal manager and director compensation. 
For example, the NAPF has urged companies to award manage-
ment stock options that pay off only if the company outperforms a 
broad index of all British equities,131 and the ISC opposes stock-
option awards and retirement plans for directors.132 But British ex-
ecutive compensation is, on the whole, even less sensitive to firm 
performance than American compensation. Very few public U.K. 
companies have adopted incentive compensation arrangements, 
and only seven of the FTSE-100 fully meet the Cadbury Commit-
tee's recommendations on remuneration.133 
The complex incentives created by different pay schemes make 
it hard to tell whether these proposals are sound; indeed, the ABI 
does not endorse the NAPF proposal. Still, the outlandish compen-
sation of CEOs at many American (and some British) firms134 sug-
gests that this is an appropriate area for shareholder oversight. One 
wonders whether the relative restraint shown by British CEOs is 
self-restraint or reflects British shareholders' greater power to ob-
ject to inappropriate pay levels. 
131. See Norma Cohen, Stock option schemes queried, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 10. 
132. ISC, ROLE AND DUTIES OF DIRECTORS (1991), supra note 63, at 3. 
133. See Directors' pay, FIN. TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 12. The Cadbury Committee recom· 
mended: (i) that shareholders receive "a full and clear statement of directors' present and 
future benefits"; (ii) that future service contracts should run no longer than three years; (iii) 
that boards should have remuneration committees consisting "wholly or mainly of non-exec-
utive directors and chaired by a non-executive director"; and (iv) that executive directors 
should "play no part in decisions on their own remuneration." CADBURY CoMMITIEE RE-
PORT (1992), supra note 61, Cj[Cf 4.40-4.42. 
134. See generally GRAEF s. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION 
OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1992). 
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7. Diversification: The Objections Not Made 
A major motive for U.S. takeovers in the 1980s was reversing 
prior diversification efforts, most of which had turned out badly.13s 
Active shareholders could potentially discourage diversification, 
which may benefit undiversified or empire-building managers at the 
expense of already diversified shareholders.136 Yet many large Brit-
ish firms diversified over the same period as their American coun-
terparts, with similarly poor results, based on anecdotal evidence. 
Large shareholders largely sat on the sidelines and watched the di-
versification trend unfold. 
The lack of organized shareholder opposition to diversification 
efforts is understandable. Neither of the two principal justifications 
for intervention applies to these cases. First, there was no principle 
of shareholder rights at stake; and second, there was no acute finan-
cial crisis. Absent these conditions, British institutions are gener-
ally unwilling to intervene. Imprudent diversification may become 
one item in a list of particulars that the institutions would raise in 
pushing for managerial change, but this relatively weak constraint 
did not stop the diversification trend. Whatever the cause, share-
holder failure to object more strongly to diversification efforts sug-
gests limits on the potency of British-style oversight. The survival 
of conglomeration as a respectable strategy also suggests that share-
holder oversight cannot fully substitute for the market for corpo-
rate control, in which a financial entrepreneur can profit by 
breaking a conglomerate into several parts and selling the pieces. 
D. Proxy Fights: The Exceptional Case 
Given the concentrated institutional ownership of British equi-
ties, it is reasonable to presume that institutions in Britain should 
be able to exercise voting control, at least when the case for inter-
vention seems clear. Nonetheless, instances in which institutions 
have publicly taken coordinated action to oust managers are con-
spicuous by their rarity. 
The paucity of visible examples may reflect British preference 
for quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiation. Just as most lawsuits set-
tle without trial, most corporate governance disputes may be re-
135. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD s. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CoRPORA'IE AcomsmoNs ch. 9 (2d ed. 1994); Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, in BROOK-
INGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcnvITY: MICROECONOMICS 1990, at 1 (Martin N. Baily & 
Clifford Winston eds.). 
136. See, e.g., Black {1992b), supra note 17, at 903-06. 
2042 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 92:1997 
solved privately as the parties "bargain in the shadow of the law." 
Yet, the process of backstage negotiation should sometimes break 
down and leave discernible evidence of the formation of investor 
coalitions. The folklore of the City provides only a few well-known 
stories of such interventions through the early 1980s, notably the 
campaigns to change management at Rank and Woolworths. 
Nonetheless, on at least three occasions between 1991and1993, 
a coalition of institutional investors publicly undertook to remove a 
board of directors, and threats of similar interventions have 
prompted management changes in other recent cases. These recent 
interventions may suggest an increase in the willingness of institu-
tional investors to take collective action, which in turn could reflect 
the growing concentration of share ownership. 
The first of these battles was the 1991 effort by a coalition of 
institutions led by Norwich Union, one of Britain's largest insur-
ance companies, to replace the board of Tace PLC.137 This contest 
received widespread press attention, both because it was the first 
instance in recent memory in which negotiations broke down so 
thoroughly that the entire board was removed and because the in-
stitutional group was led by the chairman of the Institutional Share-
holders' Committee. Press accounts branded Tace management as 
"profligate, inefficient and arrogant," and portrayed the contest as 
demonstrating the power of institutional shareholders.138 Still, a 
closer analysis suggests that this was a battle that both sides stum-
bled into and from which the institutions emerged scarred and ea-
ger to avoid further public fights. 
The circumstances surrounding the Tace fight were unusual in 
several respects. First, the company's founder and chief executive 
held a 23 % block and apparently believed - incorrectly - that he 
could win a vote at a special shareholders' meeting. Second, the 
dispute centered less around poor financial results than around the 
very high compensation paid to Tace's founder. The battle was pre-
cipitated in 1990 when the outside director who had been the insti-
tutions' ally resigned, apparently after a falling out with the 
founder. The customary round of nonpublic meetings between 
137. For pieces of the Tace story, see Norma Cohen, Getting directors on board, FIN. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at 12; Richard Gourlay, 4.4% holding in Tace changes hands, FIN. TIMES, 
June 24, 1991, at 18; Richard Gourlay, Institutions launch bid to oust Tace board, F1N. TIMES, 
May 4, 1991, at 10 [hereinafter Gourlay, Institutions launch bid]; Richard Gourlay, Tace 
board quits at angry EGM, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at 23; Price (1991) supra note 41, at 3. 
The description of the Tace battle in the text is based on these sources and on our interviews 
with some of the participants. 
138. Cohen (1992) supra note 137, at 12. 
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large shareholders and Tace management failed, over the next year, 
to produce any results. Apparently, at some point a shareholder 
complained to the Bank of England about the remuneration paid 
by Tace to its founder. Sidestepping direct involvement, the Bank 
of England advised the shareholder to contact Norwich Union, 
which held 5% of Tace's shares. 
Here, the plot thickens. Negotiations began between the insti-
tutions and the Tace board over the selection of a new chief execu-
tive officer. Then, without consulting the institutions, the Tace 
board chose a successor that the institutions found unacceptable, 
apparently because of his close associations with the founder. In-
sulted and also conscious of the surrogate role that Norwich Union 
had been delegated by the Bank of England, E.M. Sandland, Nor-
wich Union's chief investment officer and the chairman of the Insti-
tutional Shareholders' Committee, quickly lined up two other 
institutional shareholders - Framlington and GT Management -
to share the cost of a campaign to oust the Tace board. 
Framlington, which held 16% of Tace, stayed with the coalition 
over a several-month battle, but GT Management soon dropped 
out. Other institutions were kept in the coalition, according to San-
dland, only through "active handholding" by Norwich Union. 
Tace's management did not remain passive; it used its own in-
vestment bankers to contact shareholders and assembled a friendly 
29% block of the stock. Then, in midcontest, an unaffiliated bidder 
announced an unsolicited tender offer, which touched off a bidding 
contest. This gave management a new argument: that the proxy 
fight should be shelved until the takeover battle was resolved. De-
spite these obstacles, Norwich Union assembled proxies from 40% 
of Tace's shareholders, <;:ailed an emergency general meeting of the 
shareholders, and voted the board out of office at an acrimonious 
meeting. 
The implications of the Tace battle can be read in various ways. 
Although the media lionized Sandland and Norwich Union as re-
formers, Sandland's actions were questioned by his own board and 
by many of his fellow fund managers. Although Sandland was de-
fended by all insurance company officials that we interviewed, sev-
eral fund managers either criticized him for "headline hunting" or 
disavowed his "un-British approach" that would embarrass the 
City. Victory was also bittersweet for Norwich Union, because it 
and Framlington were forced to split a £60,000 bill for solicitors' 
services. Other institutions declined to share these costs. The Tace 
battle thus shows both the push-comes-to-shove power of institu-
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tional investors and the enduring significance of the free rider 
problem. 
The significance of the Tace episode is further clouded by the 
fact that Tace was a relatively small company, with sales of only £36 
million, and that Norwich Union was encouraged by the Bank of 
England. Further, given the difficulties that Norwich Union had in 
holding together a relatively small coalition, it is uncertain whether 
any single institution would be able to assemble and maintain the 
much larger coalition needed to challenge management at a major 
firm, such as General Electric Company, whose financial perform-
ance has been lackluster but whose sales total £9.5 billion.139 Free 
rider problems might be ameliorated if an umbrella organization 
helped to form the coalition, but the Institutional Shareholders' 
Committee has withdrawn from playing such a role.140 
In a second public campaign begun by institutional investors in 
1991, the chief executive of Brown & Jackson, a large British dis-
count retailing chain, was ousted, and virtually all the firm's senior 
management were replaced.141 The apparent cause of the share-
holder revolt at Brown & Jackson was a combination of poor oper-
ating results and a disastrous 1988 acquisition of an unrelated 
business from a selling group that included the ousted chairman. 
Institutional distaste for self-dealing may have been evident here, as 
in Tace. Initially, the institutions demanded that the entire board 
resign, but after Brown & Jackson switched to an investment bank-
ing firm that had the institutions' confidence, they agreed to a less 
drastic transition, in which the old board, and a new CEO picked by 
the outgoing CEO, would remain, but the new CEO would leave if 
the new financial advisor concluded that he should do so. 
Perhaps because Brown & Jackson did not carry the fight to the 
bitter end, there was less fallout, and surely less cost, from the 
Brown & Jackson campaign than from the Tace campaign. But it is 
still potentially significant that the lead institution in Brown & Jack-
son was Fidelity Investments Ltd., a subsidiary of Fidelity Group, 
the largest U.S. mutual fund group. Perhaps Fidelity, because it 
was foreign-owned and thus less subject to local conflicts of inter-
139. See Clare Dobie, Why laggard GEC needs new boss, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 2, 
1991, at 19. 
140. See supra section 11.B.2. 
141. For pieces of the Brown & Jackson story, see Neil Bennett, Brown & Jackson to seek 
rescue approval, THE TIMES (London), June 15, 1992, § 2 (Business), at 20; Alistair Blair, A 
coalition versus a dictator, FIN. TIMES, May 27, 1992, at 13; Norma Cohen, New adviser at 
Brown & Jackson, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at 24; Norma Cohen, Tough tactics behind the 
unit trusts, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1992, at 15. The description of the Brown & Jackson campaign 
in text is based on these sources and on our interviews. 
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est, felt less constrained in mounting a public campaign. Moreover, 
the Brown & Jackson campaign had a personal cost for Fidelity's 
chief corporate governance man, Alistair Blair, who was sacked not 
long thereafter - reportedly because "it was felt by [Fidelity's] 
marketing men . . . that such activity drew too much attention to 
Fidelity's investment failures."142 
Fidelity has, moreover, had losses as well as victories. In 1992, it 
vigorously opposed a debt restructuring at WPP Group PLC, the 
giant British advertising firm, arguing that the restructuring favored 
debtholders over shareholders. But Fidelity, which held 10% of 
WPP's preferred stock, was unable to niuster enough support from 
other institutions to obtain the 25%-no vote needed to block the 
restructuring. With defeat imminent, Fidelity abandoned its oppo-
sition in return for the modest concession that the preferred shares 
would be represented on the new WPP board.143 
The most recent widely publicized fight was the 1993 campaign 
led by Prudential to install new management at Spring Ram.144 
Spring Ram's founder and CEO Bill Rooney, who owned 16% of 
its stock, had shown bad business judgment in pursuing new ven-
tures in a recessionary climate. With earnings under pressure, he 
pushed Spring Ram's operating divisions and accountants to report 
good news, which led the accountants to resign and one division to 
falsify the numbers it reported to top management. When these 
problems surfaced, Prudential and other institutions informally 
urged Spring Ram to find a new CEO, but were rebuffed by 
Rooney and his handpicked board. Spring Ram did appoint a new 
finance director with strong ties to Prudential, presumably at the 
Pru's urgings, but after a further bad earnings report, Prudential 
(which held 12% of Spring Ram), Lazard Freres (which held 6%), 
Standard Life, and Barings decided that Rooney had to go. 
Rooney continued to resist, but Prudential was able to amass 
the support of about a dozen institutions, collectively holding 35% 
of Spring Ram's stock - enough to replace the board if a proxy 
142. Tim Blackstone, Fidelity Goes Mad on Media, EVENING STANDARD, May 1, 1992, at 
35, available in LEXIS, News Library, Estand File; see also Blair {1992), supra note 141 (re-
marking, in an article offering advice to other activist investment officers: "Beware your own 
chief executive. Does it look wise, from where he sits, to put your firm in the spotlight?"). 
143. For overviews of this dispute, see Melcher & Oster {1993), supra note 41; Pierre 
Tran, Advertising Group WPP's Debt Plan Brings New Lease on Life, REUTER LIBR. REP., 
Aug. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. 
144. For pieces of the Spring Ram story, see Andrew Bolger, Hostages to declining hous-
ing market fortunes, FIN. TIMES, Sept 23, 1993, at 20; Andrew Bolger, Rooney's future re-
mains unclear, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at 22; Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12. 
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fight was required.145 In the end, the board conceded. A new exec-
utive chairman chosen by Prudential was installed, together with a 
majority of new directors. As a face-saving gesture, Rooney re-
mained as chief executive for several more months, but the new 
chairman had the board votes to sack him and did so several 
months later. 
The publicized institutional campaigns at Tace, Brown & Jack-
son, and Spring Ram demonstrate that institutions, when they 
unite, can oust managements - but at a cost. When the parties 
bargain in the shadow of formal voting power, as they typically do, 
it is surely important that corporate managers know they will prob-
ably lose in pitched battle. Still, each episode involved a relatively 
small company; two cases - Tace and Spring Ram - raised issues 
of management integrity, to which British institutions seem particu-
larly sensitive; and in one case - Brown & Jackson - the money 
manager leading the charge soon lost his job because the publicity 
displeased his boss. 
E. The Process of Coalition Formation 
For the researcher, the strong preference of British institutions 
for behind-the-scenes action raises questions about the frequency of 
this activity, how long the process takes, the costs and obstacles in-
volved, and the issues around which institutional coalitions are 
built. The longer, more costly, and less effective the process of 
backstage negotiations, the more likely it is that the institutions will 
sell into the market, rather than organize to oppose management. 
Conversely, as institutional holdings grow, coordination costs de-
cline, while the exit option becomes more costly because of the dis-
count that an institution must absorb to sell its position. 
The 'process of coalition formation and negotiation can be 
lengthy when the object is to oust a particular firm's managers. For 
example, the institutional efforts that forced changes in chief execu-
tives at Brown & Jackson and at Great Western Resources during 
1992 (both of which were successful) "took a year or more to un-
fold, during which time the share prices declined steadily."146 The 
Tace affair also continued for nearly a year after institutional objec-
145. Prudential, Lazard Freres, Standard Life, and Barings were the only institutions 
named in press accounts and appear to have formed the core of the institutional opposition 
to Spring Ram management. The additional supporting institutions, recruited by Prudential 
when the coalition's initial efforts were rebuffed, played a smaller role in the campaign. We 
do not know how many of these institutions agreed to share the costs of a proxy fight and 
how many only agreed to vote with Prudential if a proxy fight took place. 
146. See Blair (1992), supra note 141, at 13. 
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tions were first made; the Spring Ram ouster took upwards of six 
months. The time element raises the cost of building and maintain-
ing a coalition. Moreover, once an institution joins a coalition, it 
will be expected to stand fast and not liquidate its stake in the com-
pany. Having assumed a leadership role, one loses face - within a 
cohesive community in which reputations are important - if one 
abandons the collective effort by selling one's stake. 
The process of coalition formation inevitably begins with one or 
more fund managers deciding that a company is seriously un-
derperforming - in a way that can be changed by shareholder in-
tervention. Because the largest British institutions hold very 
diversified portfolios - Prudential, for example, estimates holding 
900 U.K. stocks at any one time - recognition of a problem may 
itself be delayed. The trigger may be a public crisis or a falling 
stock price that is evident to all. Some institutional investors, how-
ever, do attempt a more elaborate monitoring relationship with 
their portfolio companies. Some insurance companies schedule 
regular review and consulting sessions with their portfolio compa-
nies. Our interviewees regularly cited Prudential as distinctive in its 
commitment to monitoring. Some referred to it as the "industrial 
statesman" of their community; the press has dubbed it the unoffi-
cial "High Sheriff of the City."147 Prudential informed us that it 
generally meets with its portfolio companies twice a year - annu-
ally for smaller companies - for a detailed review. 
Prudential's approach is not unique. Legal & General Group, 
another large insurer, estimates that it holds 500 meetings a year 
with corporate managements.148 M&G, the unit trust firm, follows 
a similar policy. At these meetings, each institution regularly raises 
corporate governance issues, particularly issues involving board 
structure. Each notes its dissatisfaction if a company has too few 
nonexecutive directors. In contrast, most fund managers are reluc-
tant to intervene with regard to specific business decisions. Some 
have said publicly that they do not believe in "bullying the board," 
and most stressed in private their own limited competence. "We 
are stock traders, not business consultants" was a recurrent refrain. 
In their words, the City intervened "only when the company 
seemed to have lost its way." 
Asked to described how the process of intervention begins, the 
interviewees agreed that dissatisfied fund managers expect the larg-
est shareholders to take the lead. The first step is usually a phone 
147. See Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5. 
148. See Dobie (1991), supra note 60, at 23. 
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call or two from a large shareholder to the CEO or a nonexecutive 
director - or perhaps from an unhappy smaller shareholder to a 
larger shareholder, to see if the larger shareholder is willing to take 
action. Depending on the response to the initial contact, and on the 
seriousness of the situation, some fraction of these calls will be fol-
lowed by further telephone calls, or by requests for face-to-face 
meetings. Other institutions expect an institution that was 
"overweighted,, in the stock to take the lead in organizing joint 
shareholder action. Overweighting means that the institution owns 
a greater share of the specific company than it owns of the market 
generally. An overweighted firm has a greater incentive to inter-
vene, because it will gain more from success than its competitors. 
In contrast, an underweighted firm is likely to remain passive, be-
cause any share price gains would help it less than its competitors, 
while it bore a disproportionate share of the costs. 
Typically, if the matter progresses beyond a telephone call or 
two, the overweighted shareholder will arrange an informal meet-
ing with management, which other institutions will probably not at-
tend. Most interviewees agreed that this meeting would produce 
considerable information and a host of defensive responses, but lit-
tle promise of change. Several pointed to the informational advan-
tage that management has - "they can always give you detailed 
reasons why their case is exceptional,, - and suggested that portfo-
lio managers who debate business strategy with company executives 
risk "getting out of our depth ... Portfolio managers are trained to 
be "good listeners,,, one remarked, not debaters. As a result, they 
said; portfolio managers typically rely either on a nonexecutive di-
rector or on the company's investment bankers for a more expert 
evaluation of the evidence than the portfolio managers are capable 
of themselves. Some interviewees stressed that they examined the 
board to see who among its nonexecutive directors they could talk 
to in confidence. Direct communication between institutional in-
vestors and outside directors seems firmly established in Britain, in 
contrast to the United States. 
If the institution is dissatisfied with the response it receives, it 
can solicit support from other institutions. However, before taking 
this step, one leading fund manager suggested, the institution might 
ask management to arrange a meeting for it with the nonexecutive 
directors and the firm's financial adviser. "Don't underestimate the 
power of a 3% shareholder; if you have 3%, you have clout,,, we 
were told. Even such a request - or its suggestion - may cause 
management to become more responsive. 
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Others, however, opined that before an institution requests a 
meeting with the independent directors, it needs to show that it is 
not an isolated dissident - that "it speaks for the shareholders." 
Some have publicly estimated that an in~titution needs to line up 
10%-15% of the company's stock before requesting a formal meet-
ing - or before the board will pay serious attention.149 In most of 
the incidents recounted to us, the instigator of the coalition had as-
sembled an even larger percentage of the shares before asking for a 
meeting with the board. One prominent fund manager described to 
us an instance in which it lined up four other institutions, who with 
it collectively held 30% of the corporation's voting stock, and was 
able without publicity to secure the resignation of the firm's CEO. 
One prerequisite to forming a coalition to replace the CEO was 
commonly noted by our interviewees. It is often not enough, they 
said, to decide that "the CEO must be sacked"; rather, the institu-
tions need to find a "savior" - someone who can tum the company 
around.150 If not, it may make more sense for the institution to sell, 
or to try to convince the board to search for a successor. Often, this 
issue can be discussed in confidence with the corporation's financial 
advisor. In a few instances, institutional investors have even 
formed a coalition with the firm's financial advisor to seek to re-
place the incumbent chief executive.151 In other instances, the insti-
tutions will propose that the company retain a different financial 
advisor, who will prepare a recapitalization plan. 
Most of the time, the institutions will never form a coalition. 
One or more unhappy institutions will communicate their concerns 
to management or to trusted nonexecutive directors; and press sto-
ries may appear stating that "institutional shareholders" are seeking 
such and such a change. The board will get the message, and either 
some change will take place or financial results will improve, dimin-
ishing the urgency of change. Sometimes the institutions will get 
what they want, but often the outcome will be a compromise. For 
example, a firm, instead of ousting the CEO, may appoint a new 
149. See Blair (1992), supra note 141, at 13. 
150. In the Tace battle, for example, Norwich Union was seeking to restore Michael 
Beckett, a former CEO of Tace, to office. See Gourlay, Institutions launch bid (1991), supra 
note 137, at 10. Similarly, at Spring Ram, Prudential knew whom it wanted as the new CEO 
- an executive who had turned around another company in which Prudential had invested 
- before it provoked a showdown with the board. See Weever & Amoore (1993), supra 
note 12. 
151. An example is the 1991 revolt of institutional investors at Granada Group. SG 
Warburg, financial adviser to the firm, apparently joined institutional investors in deciding 
that the CEO should be replaced, in part as the price for completing a rights issue that the 
investors had resisted. See Raymond Snoddy, Sacrifice to woo the franchise gods, FIN. TIMES, 
May 11, 1991, at 10. 
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nonexecutive chairman, finance director, or financial adviser, or 
promise to elect more nonexecutive directors and to consult the in-
stitutions when choosing these new directors. The institutions' will-
ingness to compromise reflects a number of factors, including their 
own uncertainty about the best course of action, the cost and diffi-
culty of building a coalition to press for more than the company is 
offering, and their strong reluctance to take public action. 
The most important question about the behind-the-scenes activ-
ism of institutions is, of course, the frequency of such activity. Little 
data exists on this question. The tip of the pyramid is a CEO sack-
ing. Piecing together various sources, there seem to have been at 
least ten companies, in addition to Tace, Brown & Jackson, and 
Spring Ram, at which institutional shareholders engineered top 
management change over the 1991-1993 period.152 The rough total 
of thirteen can be taken as a plausible lower bound, but we do not 
know how much the press missed. 
One can also ask how often a particular institution intervenes, 
or is solicited to intervene by other institutions. In 1991, testifying 
before the House of Commons, Michael Sandland, the current 
chairman of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee, was asked 
"how often the institutional shareholders are using this threat [of 
removing the board]?" He answered that he did not know what 
other institutions were doing, but was pressed to estimate how 
often his firm had engaged in such a threat. He responded: 
We saw over the last year there have been two, possibly three, con-
frontations which have reached public notice. As to the numbers of 
serious or possibly robust discussions which have not surfaced in the 
press or wider public I find it very difficult, maybe a dozen.153 
Following up on this estimate, we asked all our interviewees 
how often they had been approached within the last twelve months 
to join an informal coalition to pressure a company's management 
or board for specific changes or reforms. The highest estimate we 
received was from the activist fund manager who told us not to un-
derestimate the power of a 3% shareholder. He said that his firm 
had received six such requests within the past year. In two cases, 
152. See Blair (1992), supra note 141 (naming Great Western Resources); Jackson (1991), 
supra note 10, at 18 (reporting the ouster of the Budgens chairman at the instigation of 
Electra, IEP, and Gartmore; also naming Asda and Scicon); Walsh (1991), supra note 19, at 9 
(reporting that the Granada CEO was replaced to enable a rights offering to succeed, and 
that Schroders was the key figure in the investor revolt); Weever & Amoore (1993), supra 
note 12 (naming Pentos, Alexon, BET, Bunzl, and Amber Day). In a few of these cases, 
press accounts name only unidentified institutional investors, and there is some ambiguity 
over whether the board acted on its own, or only because it was pushed. 
153. TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, supra note 94, at 278. 
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this process resulted in the coalition's indicating to the board that it 
intended to convene an emergency general meeting to remove 
board members, as in Tace. In each of these two instances, the 
threat worked, the desired management changes were achieved, 
and no special meeting was called. A major insurer, in contrast, 
although widely recognized as an activist within its peer group of 
leading investors, reported that it had joined an institutional coali-
tion only once or twice a year over the past two years. However, 
this insurer also had as many as twenty discussions a year with one 
or more other institutions about the need to "strengthen the 
boards" firms in its portfolio. 
Several factors could explain the different behavior of these in-
stitutions. One involves the composition of their respective equity 
portfolios. The insurance company invests heavily in Britain's larg-
est companies, while the activist fund manager specializes in emerg-
ing, higher-technology growth companies. It is harder to build a 
coalition to remove the CEO of a major British corporation than in 
the case of a smaller firm, and much harder to keep the coalition 
out of the public eye. The effort will take more·time, more effort, 
more legal and investment banking fees, and pose a greater risk of 
reprisal from managemen~'s allies. These concerns may outweigh 
the larger financial gains that are possible by improving a larger 
firm's management. Second, for smaller companies, a coalition of 
four or five investors, who are often in regular contact anyway, may 
already hold a large enough block to be virtually assured of success. 
In contrast, to be decisive at a major firm, a shareholder coalition 
would have to have more members. Third, fraud, self-dealing, and 
gross managerial incompetence may simply be more frequent for 
emerging companies than for well-established firms. Finally, be-
cause of the insurance company's size and prestige, its own voice 
may carry sufficient "clout" with the board, even without a coali-
tion behind ·it, but with the implicit threat that a coalition could be 
built. 
Other institutions, when asked how often they had joined or 
been approached to join a shareholder coalition, sought to redefine 
the question. One large fund manager drew a distinction, similar to 
that offered by Sandland, between conferences with a group of 
other institutions about a specific company and a coalition that ac-
tively opposes the board. The manager estimated that the fund par-
ticipated in a dozen private conferences a year with other 
institutions concerning British companies, but rarely was involved 
in active confrontation with a board. To call an emergency general 
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meeting of shareholders, the manager said, was an "extraordinarily 
rare step." 
Our interviews also probed for differences in behavior between 
externally managed corporate pension funds and the quasi-public 
pension funds associated with formerly nationalized industries, 
which have either an in-house staff or a long-term relationship with 
an essentially captive adviser. Few major differences emerged. The 
in-house manager of a quasi-public pension fund described itself as 
having received "less than six" requests to join such a coalition over 
the past two years. Given this fund's activist reputation, it would 
seem a logical candidate for another dissatisfied institution to con-
tact. The fund had itself on two occasions within the last year 
sought to assemble an institutional group to persuade firms to add 
nonexecutive directors to their boards. In general, the quasi-public 
pension funds expressed a stronger interest in intervening with re-
gard to general corporate governance issues such as board struc-
ture, even when the subject corporation is performing well, than did 
fund managers who were affiliated with merchant banks. 
All in all, the formation of institutional coalitions can be de-
scribed as an out-of-the-ordinary event - neither extraordinary 
nor frequent. Informal contacts with management or the board 
that never reach the stage of coalition building are more frequent 
- we have heard estimates as high as thirty to forty times per year 
- but still reach only a small percentage of British firms in any 
given year. 
Interviewees were also asked how large an institutional coalition 
could be cohesively assembled. Florence and Scott had theorized 
that the largest twenty shareholders could act, in Scott's phrase, as a 
"controlling constellation."154 The interviewees estimated that 
forming and maintaining a cohesive group became much more diffi-
cult above about five or so members. The largest group that we 
know of is the dozen institutions that supported Prudential in the 
Spring Ram episode - when Prudential, perhaps wishing to avoid 
a repeat of the Tace controversy, may have assembled a large group 
to convince a recalcitrant board not to fight to the bitter end. Yet 
even here, there were only four lead institutions named in the press 
accounts who, when the need arose, assembled a larger number of 
less active supporters. 
What types of issues trigger the formation of a coalition? Most 
interviewees responded that it usually took a financial crisis, includ-
154. Scorr (1986), supra note 101, at 87. 
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ing a sharp decline in share price, or an event personally discredit-
ing management to provoke the institutions into action. One fund 
manager suggested that coalitions could be formed to reverse ex-
cessive diversification or to encourage the disposition of unneces-
sary or unprofitable assets - "unbundling" in the current British 
parlance - but we are not aware of any instance in which a coali-
tion has been formed with this as its principal goal. Only quasi-
public pension funds such as Postel and the National Coal Board 
described themselves as interested in seeking corporate governance 
reforms unrelated to any change in management or strategic plans. 
Lastly, our interviewees were invited to address when they 
would intervene in a portfolio company's affairs and when they 
would simply sell. Several responded to this question by focusing 
on the size of their position - the smaller the position, the more 
attractive the exit option would be. But it was clear that exit was a 
preferred strategy for many. A comment by one major fund man-
ager conveys the attitude of many of his colleagues: 
[A] dissatisfied portfolio manager will sell off if he doubts the quality 
of a management. I would estimate that sale is far more frequent 
than any ... attempts to become involved in corporate governance. 
There is at least a 10:1 ratio of sale over crisis talks or group action or 
involvement. Group action occurs when there is an unexpected crisis 
(either a performance-crisis or a corporate governance crisis). Both 
occur, but the interests of our clients lead us to prefer taking the ear-
lier step of selling when we sense future problems, rather than waiting 
for a crisis. We try to prevent a crisis or sell before it. 
F. Summary 
To the extent that our interviews can provide a look behind the 
curtain, they suggest the following generalizations. 
1. For most British institutions, activism is largely crisis driven. 
The largest insurance firms - Prudential, Norwich, and Legal & 
General - and a few large unit trusts - chiefly, M&G - engage 
in regular proactive monitoring and press for governance changes 
independent from a financial or operational crisis. But they have 
limited resources and focus their efforts on poorly performing 
firms. The prospering public corporation can resist corporate gov-
ernance reforms, if it wishes, with little fear of institutional 
intervention.1ss 
155. Guinness, for example, recently elected a single chief executive and board chairman 
when its old chief executive retired, despite institutional pressure to separate the two posi-
tions. See Jane Simms, Management: Investor pressure builds on all-in-one executive, THE 
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 16, 1992, at 19. Similarly, Marks & Spencer recently combined the two 
positions after earlier separating them. See Dobie (1991), supra note 60. 
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2. The rate of shareholder interventions to replace manage-
ment appears to have risen in the last few years. This increase in· 
activism could reflect increased share)J.older concentration, but it 
could also be a cyclical response to the severe recession that 
plagued the British economy until recently.156 
3. With proxy fights rare and difficult to pull off, an important 
source of institutions' power is their ability to reject a subscription 
offering. Preemptive rights, which strike those schooled in finance 
theory in the United States as unimportant, are central to U.K. cor-
porate governance. The effectiveness of this weapon depends on 
laws and stock exchange rules protecting preemptive rights. 
4. Absent a generally accepted mechanism for cost sharing, 
even successful proxy battles, such as the Tace affair, can seem like 
Pyrrhic victories to the institutions leading the charge. They will be 
rare and conducted more for their deterrent value, or to respond to 
unethical management conduct, than in the hope of direct profit. 
5. Despite these obstacles, institutional coalitions - usually 
small in number of participants but with substantial collective 
shareholdings - do form. Their threat to oppose management and 
even remove the board is credible and has repeatedly resulted in 
CEO resignations. 
6. Whenever possible, the institutions prefer to operate in the 
shadows. The prevailing view, even among activist managers, is 
that "secrecy and trust are essential."157 
These conclusions may seem to produce a paradox: institutions 
are highly reluctant to engage in public proxy battles, but corpora-
tions consider the institutions' threat to employ such a weapon 
credible. The paradox, however, is only superficial. There are 
other well-understood contexts in which one can credibly threaten a 
step that will make one worse off. One such situation is when, by so 
doing, one can force one's adversary to incur even greater expected 
costs. This is the theory of nuisance litigation: if the plaintiff by 
expending $1 can force the defense to expend $3, then the plaintiff 
may be able to secure a settlement even in a weak case when the 
plaintiff would not want to incur the expense of a trial.158 In the 
156. As Michael Sandland of Norwich Union put it in commenting on the recession's 
impact on institutional activism: "At the start of the '90s, the tide went out. You walked 
along the wet sand and found unmentionable things left behind." See Makin (1992), supra 
note 127, at 135. 
157. Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5 (quoting Michael Bishop of 
Gartmore). 
158. See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in which S11its are Bro11ght for their Nui-
sance Value, 5 INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 3 (1985). 
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governance context, whatever the costs of intervention to the insti-
tutions, the threatened managers of their portfolio companies have 
even more at stake. They stand to lose jobs, perquisites, and pro-
fessional reputations. Hence, they are not eager to completely re-
buff institutions, and gamble that the institutions are bluffing, when 
the institutions threaten a voting contest. 
Moreover, the institutions may not be bluffing. In a repeated 
game context, where the reputation you build today is critical to 
future success, major institutions might pursue a proxy fight that is 
uneconomic apart from its deterrence value for future cases. In-
deed, the need to preserve one's reputation can be used as a tactical 
weapon to convince a recalcitrant board not to force the matter to 
the end stage of a proxy fight. For example, by going public in 
Spring Ram, Prudential, and Lazard Freres put themselves in a po-
sition in which a proxy fight became preferable to surrendering to 
Spring Ram's management. 
This analysis - that both sides can lose from voting contests -
can explain the strong preference for behind-the-scenes settle-
ments. Both sides have reason to threaten steps that are costly to 
them, hoping that a bluff will work. Publicity may lock either or 
both sides into positions they would prefer only to hint at and not 
overtly threaten. By bargaining in the shadows, costs, including 
reputational damage to individuals and institutions, can be 
minimized. 
V. THE LIMITS ON INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM 
This Part will examine in greater detail the factors that affect the 
formation of institutional coalitions and other forms of institutional 
involvement in corporate governance. Our interview data suggests 
that coalition formation is relatively infrequent and that coalitions 
are small, rarely more than four or five members. Moreover, many 
British firms persist in practices - notably diversification with poor 
results - that could elicit institutional objection, but generally do 
not. Instead, the limited resource of institutional attention is fo-
cused on the worst performers and on cases tinged with scandal or 
self-dealing. 
A. Direct and Indirect Costs of Coordination 
As noted earlier, Norwich Union and Framlington were forced 
to divide a £60,000 bill for the Tace proxy fight. Collectively, these 
two firms held roughly 20% of Tace. They had obtained the proxies 
of an additional 20% - but not the agreement of these other 
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shareholders to share expenses.159 This fact pattern underscores 
two distinct problems: 
First, there is the classic free-rider problem. Even with a sub-
stantial 20% stake between them, Norwich Union and Framlington 
would have to value the gains to Tace from replacing the old board 
at more than £300,000 before incurring a £60,000 cost would make 
economic sense, even if ultimate success were certain. This may 
help to explain why activist institutions usually try to develop a 
15%-20% coalition before seeking a formal meeting with outside 
directors. A request by a smaller group would be less credible, in 
part because a small group is unlikely to be willing to incur signifi-
cant expenditures. A successful effort to obtain control of the 
board may lead to expense reimbursement, but this did not happen 
in Tace because an independent bidder acquired the firm. More-
over, campaigns not directed at control do not carry even the possi-
bility of expense reimbursement, though costs are probably lower 
as well. 
The economics of a proxy campaign look better if one considers 
that the investors' action will demonstrate their credibility and de-
ter managers of other firms from engaging in conduct adverse to 
shareholder interests. Nonetheless, the smaller the stake, the 
greater the expected gain must be before shareholders can justify 
incurring any costs. Moreover, much of the benefit from general 
deterrence will flow to one's competitors. Yet, as we discuss below, 
many money managers care as much about relative performance as 
about the absolute return on monitoring expenditures. 
Second, the Tace battle underlines the difficulty that institutions 
face in seeking agreement o:ri cost sharing, even if they agree on the 
desired substantive outcome. One problem, our interviewees told 
us, is that pension fund managers lack the authority to spend pen-
sion assets on a proxy campaign. Of course, a fund manager could 
request authority from pension trustees, but this puts the fund man-
ager in a doubly uncomfortable position: (i) perhaps implicitly war-
ranting the success of the intervention, and (ii) having to justify the 
proposed actions to pension fund trustees who themselves may be 
corporate officers and potential targets of such activism. Our inter-
viewees stressed that pension fund management is intensively com-
petitive. In addition, a successful fund manager will have many 
clients, making it time-consuming to solicit the consent of each. As 
159. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
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a result, fund managers rarely ask pension fund trustees for an addi-
tional contribution to fund governance activism. 
If proxy campaigns were common, fund managers could seek 
such authority ex ante as part of their basic contract. But up to 
now, overt action has been infrequent. Moreover, there are advan-
tages to being unable to contribute to a campaign oneself, when 
others are not so constrained. 
If a pension fund manager does not seek reimbursement from 
its clients for expenses, then the expected benefit must be huge to 
justify the manager incurring any expense. Assume for example 
that: (i) a pension fund manager holds a 1 % stake worth £10 mil-
lion in a particular firm; and (ii) the proposed intervention will raise 
the value of this holding by 10%, or £1 million. It is in the clients' 
interest to contribute £30,000 to a joint shareholder fund to finance 
the intervention. But is it in the fund manager's interest to do so? 
U.K. fund managers are typically compensated, like their U.S. 
counterparts, on the basis of a percentage of funds under manage-
ment, and incentive compensation is rarely used. Suppose that a 
manager receives an annual fee equal to 1 % of the assets it man-
ages.160 A £1 million increase in the fund's asset value will increase 
the fund manager's annual fee by £10,000. This expected but uncer-
tain annual gain of £10,000 may or may not induce the fund man-
ager to advance £30,000 of its own, but clearly its incentives are 
different from those of its clients, whose expected gain is 
£1,000,000. In short, agency costs at the fund-manager level can re-
sult in underfunding of collective action that it would be rational for 
the investors in the fund to undertake. 
To be sure, a fund manager that undertakes successful share-
holder interventions may attract new clients and thus increase funds 
under management. But other fund managers also benefit from the 
successful intervention, so the fund manager's relative performance 
versus his "free riding» rivals. may not be improved. Also, a reputa-
tion as a shareholder activist is a dubious marketing tool in a world 
in which corporate managers, who may be skeptical of such activ-
ism, control most pension fund assets. 
This agency-cost explanation for passivity may partly explain 
why British insurers have been, on the whole, more activist than 
pension fund managers. Because they primarily manage their own 
money, they need only consider whether the costs of activism are 
160. Actual pension management fees are usually lower than this. See Cohen, supra note 
56, at 6 (typical "pure" charges are 0.2%-0.5% per year; smaller accounts and accounts in-
vested in overseas assets may pay total fees of up to 1 % per year. 
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justified by the direct benefits to them as investors (rather than as 
agents of investors). 
That many British insurers are mutual companies could also 
help to explain their relative activism.161 Mutual companies have 
no shareholders and ·thus may thus be less subject to cost con-
straints that limit their activism as investors. Their managements 
may have discretion to pursue policies, including corporate govern-
ance policies, that they consider correct, even if this means bearing 
some costs for free riders. In this freedom from shareholder over-
sight, British mutual insurers parallel to a degree U.S. public pen-
sion funds, which have been the most active American institu"tions. 
Although we do not mean to suggest that the solution to corporate 
governance problems is to insulate the watchers from market over-
sight, it is ironic that some of the most active monitors in both the 
United States and Britain are, to varying degrees, exempt from such 
oversight themselves. 
In theory, incentive compensation can reduce these agency-cost 
problems. A fund manager who turns around a portfolio company 
might receive, for example, some percentage of the gain - say 
10% - instead of a few basis points. In the United States, incen-
tive compensation for fund managers is limited by SEC rules,162 but 
in the United Kingdom, there is no legal prohibition on incentive 
compensation. Yet incentive compensation is rarely used. When 
we asked fund managers why, the most common explanation in-
volved the clients' predictable response when the topic was raised. 
Clients ask "what they get by paying more." The fund manager 
cannot promise that clients who pay incentive compensation will 
receive higher returns or better service than other customers with-
out offending the latter - and possibly legal rules as well. Because 
all clients must be treated more or less alike or the disfavored will 
leave, the manager must convince most clients to pay the incentive 
compensation or else stay with a standard fee structure. This may 
be more trouble than it is worth. Perhaps too, though they did not 
say so, fund managers know that clients will want incentive com-
pensation to be a two-way street, and prefer to charge less risky, 
asset-based fees. 
The indirect costs of shareholder activism may be even more 
important than the direct costs. Forming and maintaining a share-
holder coalition takes a substantial amount of time. Diplomatic 
161. Norwich Union, for example, is a mutual. 
162. Investment Advisers Act Rule 205-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (1993); see Coffee 
(1991), supra note 3, at 1362-66. 
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niceties require that contacts between institutions be conducted by 
senior executives. The time so consumed reduces the time available 
to contact existing or prospective clients or review other stocks in 
the institution's portfolio. One veteran of these battles believes 
that the institution seeking to assemble the coalition must win the 
support of "three of the top five institutional shareholders in the 
company" in order to a form a minimally credible coalition.163 But 
this only begins the process. The investment officer who is seeking 
to form the coalition must also meet and consult with (1) the com-
pany's management, (2) his firm's clients, (3) other senior officers 
within his own institution, and ( 4) potential allies among institu-
tional investors. The investment officer must convince his firm's se-
nior management, the firm's clients, or both, to commit funds for 
professional fees. Resistance from both groups is common.164 
The effort to win the support of uncommitted institutions will 
consume still more time. Both sides are apt to hold meetings with 
them. The company will then most likely announce some changes 
and reforms. But are these reforms substantive or only cosmetic? 
All members of the embryonic coalition will need to confer over 
this question, and some may drop out. Meanwhile, the company 
will unleash its own solicitors and investment bankers. If the dis-
pute becomes public, the media will be drawn into the fray. All this 
for a dispute involving only one stock in the portfolio of an institu-
tion owning, in all likelihood, several hundred stocks. There is also 
an important hidden cost: other company managers may become 
less open with your institution because they fear that if you learn 
adverse information, you may demand a management shake-up.165 
Inevitably, these costs must be passed on to clients in some 
form. Meanwhile, rival firms can free ride on the activist fund man-
ager's efforts, while focusing on their core business of securities re-
search and stock picking. 
B. Conflicts of Interest 
Many pension fund managers are affiliated with merchant bank-
ing firms. If the parent merchant bank represents a company in the 
fund manager's portfolio or a firm involved in a takeover bid for 
that company, an actual or potential conflict of interest exists. All 
fund managers are always seeking new corporate business, and 
merchant banks are always seeking new securities underwriting cli-
163. Blair (1992), supra note 141, at 13. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
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ents. Mutual funds, too, often seek to manage pension money. 
When soliciting corporate clients, a reputation as a troublemaker is 
something devoutly to be wished on one's competitors and avoided 
for oneself. A merchant bank's optimum public profile, in the 
words of one banker, is "below the level of the floor."166 
Thus, it is not surprising that in Britain, as in the United States, 
most corporate pension plans follow a variant of the golden rule: 
"Do unto other companies as you would have their pension funds 
do unto your company."167 In other words, support management. 
British corporate pension plans are not subject to even the minimal 
regulatory oversight provided in the United States by the Depart-
ment of Labor, which requires that pension plan trustees cast in-
formed votes and vote in the interests of plan beneficiaries, not the 
corporate sponsor.16s 
As some interviewees remarked, some of the most active pen-
sion fund and mutual fund managers have foreign parents and are 
less affected by these conflicts. For example, Gartmore (affiliated 
with Banque Indosuez, a French investment bank) and Phillips & 
Drew (owned by Union Bank of Switzerland) are among the most 
active pension fund managers, and Fidelity Investments Ltd. ( affili-
ated with U.S.-based Fidelity Group) led the Brown & Jackson 
campaign. 
In contrast, several interviewees suggested that the relatively 
low profile on corporate governance issues of Mercury Asset Man-
agement, the largest British pension fund manager, reflected its sta-
tus as a 75%-owned subsidiary of SG Warburg, a major British 
investment bank. A high profile might cost both Mercury and 
Warburg some current or future clients. There was also a potential 
for embarrassment if Mercury disagreed with Warburg's advice to a 
corporate client. Possibly as a result, Mercury, we are told, prefers 
not to keep voting power for the shares it manages. Yet what 
counts as relative passivity in Britain might be considered activist in 
the United States - Mercury recently joined a group of institutions 
that successfully demanded management change at Alexon Group 
as the price of a rights offering's success.169 
166. Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5. 
167. JAMES E. HEARD & HOWARD D. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY 
VOTING SYSTEM (Investor Responsibility Research Ctr. 1987); O'BARR & CoNLEY (1992), 
supra note 40, at 200; see also Black (1990), supra note 2, at 595-98. 
168. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., THEISS PROXY VOTING MAN· 
UAL 1.7-1.21 (3d ed. 1993) (reviewing Department of Labor guidelines). 
169. See Roland Rudd, Institutions force management change at Alexon Group, FIN. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at 19; see also Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5 (reporting 
on Mercury's role in pushing out the founder and CEO of Pentos). 
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There is little evidence of overt corporate retaliation or pressure 
on the more active institutions. British commentators largely dis-
count the possibility that pension plan trustees - even though they 
are often the corporation's own officers - would directly seek to 
influence how an external manager votes.17° Although a merchant 
bank's self-interest may counsel passivity even without overt pres-
sure from its clients, there is a countervailing pressure: relative per-
formance is the principal benchmark of success in competing for 
pension accounts. Some activist firms, notably Fidelity and 
Gartmore, have attracted substantial business away from older, 
more established firms. 
In the United States, some companies have chosen to keep vot-
ing in-house. Outside money managers pick stocks; corporate of-
ficers vote them. The self-evident purpose is to ensure promanager 
votes. Splitting stock-picking and voting in this way appears un-
common in Britain. However, conflicts may underlie the common 
requirement that pension fund managers consult clients before they 
cast "contentious" antimanager votes or spend plan assets on a gov-
ernance campaign. A contract that discourages activism is likely to 
be congenial to corporate managers, who may worry that activism 
will be targeted at them. 
Although the conflicts issue rears its head most noticeably in the 
case of pension fund managers, insurance companies are not im-
mune, partly because they are active pension fund managers. In the 
early 1990s, Prudential ran an advertisement in newspapers stating 
that out of 480 tender offer bids since 1984, it had failed to support 
management in only around twenty-five cases. Referring to this ad 
in testimony before the House of Commons, Michael Sandland of 
Norwich Union responded that out of 385 tender offers since 1984, 
Norwich had failed to support management in only eleven cases.171 
Both these statistics and the marketing effort to present them to the 
public suggest the possibility of compromised loyalty. 
C. The "Race to the Exit" Scenario 
Several interviewees stressed that one danger in assembling a 
shareholder coalition was that approaching others to join a coali-
170. See RICHARD MINNS, PENSION FuNDs AND BRITISH CAPITALISM 104 (1980) 
("[V]oting is in effect what the managing institutions choose to make it."); Scorr (1986), 
supra note 101, at 25. Under the Trustee Investment Act, virtually all trustees, including 
pension plan trustees, must have advisers qualified to provide written advice on proposed 
investments. Scott argues that this strengthens the hand of the external manager. Id. at 31 
n.43. 
171. TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (1991), supra note 94, at 278. 
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tion would trigger a race to sell among institutions. As they viewed 
it, the information that a major shareholder was dissatisfied had an 
overhang effect: the proponent might sell its stock if it did not se-
cure satisfactory reforms, thereby depressing the stock's price. 
Such an overhanging block could induce other investors to sell first. 
This danger forces institutions to be careful whom they invite to 
take collective action, lest the invitations trigger a "race to the 
exit."172 This worry forces the coalition builders to narrow the field 
of potential partners, thus further complicating the process of form-
ing a coalition. Most considered selling in such a setting to be un-
ethical and possibly to constitute unlawful insider trading.173 They 
insisted that they and their usual allies would not sell their shares if 
so approached, but strongly implied that others might not be so 
ethical. 
In the U.S. securities market, with its greater dispersion of own-
ership, the information that a 3%-5% shareholder may soon sell 
seems likely to have only a modest impact on share price, unless the 
blockholder is thought to possess inside information. Within the 
more cohesive and institutionally dominated U.K. market, knowl-
edge of a large institution's impending sale could plausibly trigger a 
sell-off by other institutions if either: (i) other institutions believed 
that the selling institution had adverse private information about 
the company; or (ii) liquidation of the institution's block would sig-
nificantly alter the balance of supply and demand for the stock, pro-
ducing a short to medium term price decline. 
For example, if Prudential asked other institutions to join with it 
to change a particular company's managers, the institution receiv-
ing such a request might assume that Prudential - which regularly 
meets with company managers - had reasonable grounds for dis-
satisfaction. The process of management change could take from 
several months to more than a year to unfold, during which time 
negative assessments of the company would appear in the press, 
and its stock price would likely fall. On the other hand, disclosure 
172. One fund manager phrased this concern as follows: 
You must remember that in communicating dissatisfaction, you are possibly giving a 
signal of your future intentions. Would the person you are talking to abuse the informa-
tion by trading on it? You have to fear a race for the exit in which you will be last by 
staying to challenge management. 
173. Section 57(2) of the recently passed Criminal Justice Act 1993 defines insider to 
include shareholders. See 30 HALSBURY's CuRRENT STAT. {1994), supra note 83, Money tit., 
at 15 ("[A] person has information from an inside source if ... he has it through •.. being a 
director, employee, or shareholder."). Commentators have noted that this provision 
"cover[s] cases where ... a shareholder declines a secret approach to sell his stake to a 
potential bidder but nevertheless trades on the basis that a forthcoming bid for the company 
is likely to be made." Wotherspoon {1994), supra note 83, at 425. 
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of the formation of an institutional coalition to revitalize a slumping 
company could increase the target's share value, much like a rumor 
of a takeover or a control contest. It is an empirical question 
whether the gains are larger from selling or from fighting, and we 
have no reason to second-guess fund managers' belief that negative 
price pressure will dominate at least some of the time. 
D. "Underweighting" as a Cause of Passivity 
We have already noted that "overweighted" institutions are ex-
pected to take the lead role in shareholder intervention, and un-
derweighted institutions are unlikely to participate in a shareholder 
coalition. Prudential, the largest British institution, holds around 
3.5% of all publicly traded British equities. As a mathematical ne-
cessity, Prudential's average holding in public corporations that it 
invests in will be at least 3.5%. It will hold more than a 3.5% stake 
in some firms and less than a 3.5% stake in others. In the former 
case, it is said in the parlance of the City to be "overweighted," and 
in the latter to be "underweighted." 
It is no surprise that firms that have large percentage stakes 
tend to be the activists that organize shareholder coalitions. A 
larger stake gives them a larger incentive. Overweighting certainly 
correlates with a large percentage stake. But why should un-
derweighted firms necessarily be passive? After all, an institution 
could be underweighted in a corporation, and yet still hold 2%-3% 
of the corporation's shares and be among its largest shareholders. 
The passivity of underweighted institutions has a clear economic 
logic: Institutions are locked in a competition for investors' funds, 
which turns largely on relative performance. Thus, no institution 
wants to help its competitors at its own expense. A firm that shares 
the costs of a shareholder coalition when it is underweighted will 
benefit not only the usual free riders but, more importantly, rivals 
who are fully weighted or overweighted in the stock. For example, 
a fund manager that turns around a company in which it owns a 2 % 
stake, compared to a 3 % stake in the market, gains less than half as 
much in relative terms as a smaller rival that owns 1.5% of the com-
pany but only 1 % of the market. 
Once again, action that would benefit the manager's clients is 
chilled because it does not benefit the manager. Nor can incentive 
compensation solve this problem, as long as compensation depends 
on relative performance. Restricted diversification would make a 
manager more likely to be overweighted in the firms that it invests 
in, but ·a manager as large as Prudential may, almost of necessity, 
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own most of the British market and thus be underweighted in many 
firms. 
If one takes the logic of over- or underweighting to its logical 
conclusion, an underweighted fund manager may not even want to 
improve a portfolio company's performance. Presumably, the man-
ager will hold such a stake principally for diversification or to be a 
closet indexer who cannot outperform or underperform competi-
tors by very much. Our interviewees did not express this heretical 
view - that one might be indifferent to whether a portfolio com-
pany does well. A money manager's active expression of this per-
spective would also violate fiduciary duties and cultural norms and 
might boomerang if clients became aware of the behavior. Still, this 
perspective underscores the reluctance of underweighted firms to 
participate in a shareholder coalition. 
E. Coalitions Among Rivals 
More generally, competitors may simply find it hard to cooper-
ate. The most important British institutional investors - insurance 
companies and pension fund managers - compete intensely for in-
vestor funds. It is impossible to verify whether the natural rivalry 
between competitors affects their ability to cooperate, when they 
have common corporate governance interests, but some interview-
ees felt that this factor created a psychological barrier to coopera-
tion. Moreover, the logic of over- and underweighting often causes 
interests to diverge as well. 
Concerns like these might explain why British institutions are 
reluctant to nominate their own slates of directors. Gartmore's 
fund managers might feel uneasy about placing Robert Fleming's 
nominees on the board of a company in which Gartmore holds a 
substantial stake, for fear that Robert Fleming would gain an infor-
mational advantage. Such an advantage need not involve actiona-
ble - and unethical - insider trading. Directors inevitably have 
better soft information about a company's prospects and can con-
vey that information, or a resulting buy or sell recommendation, to 
traders in a variety of low-visibility ways. 
F. Legal Barriers 
Legal rules can affect the institutions' choice between holding 
debt and equity, the size of the stakes that the institutions own, and 
what they can do with those stakes. The effects are interrelated -
institutions that are limited in what they can do have less incentive 
to own large, influential stakes. Britain today has few significant 
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obstacles to owning equity or to holding large stakes, and only loose 
constraints on what the institutions can do.174 
The principal legal concerns are insider-trading liability and 
control-person liability. The institutions' fear of inadvertently re-
ceiving inside information, which would prevent them from trading, 
inhibits communication between shareholders and managers. Ad-
verse publicity is also a concern: no one wants to be publicly ac-
cused of unethical behavior, even if no legal liability results. 
Insider-trading related impediments to information flow can 
both limit and channel institutional oversight. Less-informed insti-
tutions, recognizing their own ignorance, will take action only in 
clear cases. They will tend to favor structural reforms, such as in-
dependent board chairmen, over intervention in specific corporate 
decisions. But without insider trading restrictions, major sharehold-
ers might use an informational edge, not to improve oversight, but 
instead to earn short-term trading profits. 
Although insi9er-trading concerns could inhibit money manag-
ers from serving as directors, such concerns seem a weak explana-
tion for why money managers do not sit on corporate boards. One 
could construct a Chinese wall to shield the director from the insti-
tution's traders, and the threat of litigation is low in Britain to begin 
with. 
A second potential legal concern is control-person liability. 
Although there is little caselaw, the perceived risk depends both on 
what you do and on how much you own. Some commentators sug-
gest that institutions do not want to nominate board members or 
get too involved in a company's business decisions, because of this 
potential liability.175 Most of our interviewees denied that control-
person liability entered their thinking, but this potential liability 
could reinforce the reluctance of some to hold very large (over 
10%) stakes. 
The principal reasons why few money managers sit on corporate 
boards seem to be nonlegal. Those interviewed stressed that they 
lacked the expertise to make or review decisions for industrial com-
panies. Other reasons include lack of need, because major share-
holders can already speak directly to corporate officers and 
174. We discussed industry-specific rules in Part II and the general framework of com-
pany law and securities regulation in Part III; we do not repeat that discussion here. 
175. See, e.g., William Kay, Money men who rule the business world, THE TIMES 
(London), Apr. 20, 1992, at 25 ("Fund managers ... are still frightened of being accused of 
trying to run the companies in which they invest. There is a legal reason for that. An out-
sider deemed to have a direct influence in how a company is managed can be as liable as the 
directors for any wrongdoing."). 
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nonexecutive directors; lack of time, because senior executives at 
major institutions can only serve on a few boards, and even that 
comes with a cost in attention to clients and to other, perhaps more 
troubled firms; and a desire to maintain objectivity and not become 
loyal to a stock that a neutral observer would sell. 
G. The Role of Political History 
Mark Roe has reported that much industry-specific regulation 
adopted in the United States since the late nineteenth century was 
expressly intended to weaken the power of financial institutions as 
shareholders.176 This American history raises the question of 
whether a similar story can be told in Britain. Researching the 
political history of legal controls on different financial institutions 
in Great Britain is a massive task; we offer here only such clues as 
we have found in the course of our research. 
Our tentative view is that a political desire to limit bank concen-
tration may have played a role, early in the twentieth century, in 
limiting the size of British banks. Fear of bank power was promi-
nent in British socialist thought early in the twentieth century. An 
important 1918 investigative committee chaired by Lord Colwyn, 
perhaps inspired by the 1912 Pujo investigation in the United 
States, produced a report on bank influence, the Colwyn Report, 
that urged that bank concentration be limited. No law to that effect 
ever passed, but large banks knew that the Bank of England would 
frown on and likely reject their merger proposals.177 Banks stayed 
smaller and thus could hold less equity. 
The effect of limited bank size on equity holdings was but-
tressed by the Bank of England's post-World War II decision not to 
count equity toward regulatory capital (we do not know the motives 
for that decision). As we discuss below, when regulatory strictures 
were relaxed in the late 1970s, it may no longer have made eco-
nomic sense for banks to hold much equity. 
We have not uncovered evidence of political concern specifically 
focused on the power of British insurers and mutual funds, who 
have never been subjected to American-style legal restrictions. The 
hobble-the-large-institutions political story is also weak for pension 
funds. Funded British pensions arose at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. Large employers took the initiative in presenting 
176. See Roe {1993), supra note 28; Roe {1993), supra note 44; Roe {1991), supra note 25; 
Roe {1991), supra note 2. 
177. For a review of this history, see JERRY COAKLEY & LAURENCE HARRIS, THE CITY 
OF CAPITAL 171-77 {1983). 
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new pension schemes to employees.178 There was little regulation, 
so employers simply adapted existing trust law.179 Employer mo-
tives included fending off organized labor, convincing Parliament to 
limit tax-funded retirement benefits, and ensuring a stable labor 
force (pension benefits were typically forfeited if an employee 
quit). 
Union-controlled pension plans coexisted with company plans, 
but company plans won out over the long haul. Although some 
unions opposed company-managed plans, others saw company 
plans as a valuable employee benefit. Funding crises caused many 
union plans to shrink or disappear. Company plans had similar cri-
ses, but were usually bailed out by the corporate parent; union 
plans had no deep pocket to look to for help. 
In sum, a direct political story for why British institutions are 
less powerful than their Japanese and German counterparts can be 
told principally for banks, and even there only in muted form. But 
perhaps an indirect story can be told. Fear of political retaliation 
could contribute to institutional passivity, and to institutional reluc-
tance to act publicly. Prudential's chairman worried publicly in 
1970 that there might be a "political reaction to any strong display 
of influence exercised over companies in which [Prudential had] 
holdings."180 Writing in the mid-1980s, Farrar and Russell opined: 
"Institutional investors are worried about the political conse-
quences of an exercise of power. Tuey eschew public criticism and 
fear public intervention."181 
This concern partly reflected the longstanding threat of nation-
alization. Many prominent industries were nationalized by Labour 
governments; the City was often threatened.182 As recently as 1976, 
the Labour Party's Executive Committee proposed nationalizing 
the seven largest insurers.183 Such threats could lead large institu-
tions to avoid publicity - even favorable publicity would call atten-
tion to the City's influence - and cultivate corporate managers as 
allies rather than possible opponents. 
178. The discussion below of the history of British pension plans draws primarily on 
HANNAH (1986), supra note 24. 
179. The tax benefits for pension plans came later, in 1921, when employers who had 
already adopted funded plans convinced Parliament to make both pension contributions and 
the income on the trust corpus exempt from income tax. 
180. PRUDENTIAL AssuRANCE Co., 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 9. 
181. John Farrar & Mark Russell, The Impact of Institutional Investment on Company 
Law, 5 CoMPANY LAw. 107, 109 (1984). 
182. See, e.g., RICHARD MINNS, TAKE OVER TIIE CITY: THE CASE FOR PUBLIC OWNER· 
SHIP OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1982). 
183. CoAKLEY & HARRIS (1983), supra note 177, at 216. 
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Concern over nationalization today seems minimal. The media 
has strongly supported the institutions in their efforts to upgrade 
corporate governance standards, backed them in the Tace affair, 
and even criticized the Cadbury report for adopting only advisory, 
not mandatory, standards. Many industries have been privatized, 
and the Labour party has moved toward the political center to 
regain political viability. The alleged "short-termism" of institu-
tional investors was a rallying cry for corporate managers during 
the late 1980s, but this theme has disappeared from the popular 
debate with a decline in the frequency of takeovers. Still, this polit-
ical history could help to explain how British institutions grew up. 
In a path-dependent wdrld, how they grew up could continue to 
influence how they behave today. 
Although nationalization seems unlikely, stricter regulation re-
mains a significant threat. Jonathan Charkham, long the Bank of 
England's chief adviser on corporate governance, recently worried 
that "to the extent that the institutions do become effective, there 
may be a backlash against their exercise of influence."184 The insti-
tutions understand too that the Labour party might win the next 
election, and the party's leaders continue to refer to the City's influ-
ence in policy documents, not with approval.185 When the heads of 
Prudential and Norwich Union boast before Parliament of their 
record in favoring management in a takeover bid, 186 they may hope 
to curry favor with Parliament as much as with corporate managers. 
H. Organizational Capability 
A final reason why British institutions do not intervene very 
often in portfolio companies involves organizational and logistical 
constraints on their capacity to monitor corporate managers. Even 
the largest insurance companies have small research staffs. For ex-
ample, Norwich Union, the catalyst in the Tace affair and the man-
ager of a £24 billion portfolio, recently expanded its staff of 
researchers who support its fund managers to twelve full-time per-
sons; as of 1986, it had none.187 Similarly, Prudential, which man-
ages a portfolio more than twice as large, estimated for us that it 
employed around twenty full-time professional analysts, including 
its senior staff, to perform research and security analysis. Yet, these 
184. Jonathan Charkham, The Bank and Corporate Governance: Past, Present and Fu-
ture, 33 BANK OF ENG. Q. Buu.. 388, 391 (1993). 
185. See Davies & Stapledon (1993), supra note 115, at 7-9. 
186. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
187. See Punters' progress (1991), supra note 55, at 88. 
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insurers hold globally diversified portfolios containing hundreds of 
U.K. stocks and many foreign stocks as well. There is a mismatch 
between staffing and portfolio size - at least if one expects serious 
monitoring. No institutional investor that we interviewed had a 
professional research staff that remotely rivaled the credit analysis 
and workout staffs of a commercial bank of co_mparable size.188 
Staffing constraints mean that monitoring resources are usually 
allocated to emergency cases, often companies that are near insol-
vency. This, in turn, reinforces the importance of preemptive rights. 
For thinly staffed money management firms, the news of an im-
pending subscription offering can signal potential trouble and alerts 
shareholders to take a close look at the offering firm, at the same 
time that the offering gives investors the leverage to force· changes. 
In the long run, of course, small staffs cannot explain limited 
oversight. We must ask why the institutions do not expand their 
research and security analysis staffs - as indeed some recently 
have.189 But only a quantum leap in research capability would 
leave them in a position comparable to a major commercial bank. 
Presumably, the major insurers and pension fund managers believe 
that such a research and oversight capability is not economically 
justifiable. The unresolved question is why. 
Even if they cannot greatly increase the staff effort devoted to 
monitoring, institutions could monitor more intensely by holding 
larger stakes in fewer companies, with only a trivial loss in diversifi-
cation. No such trend is evident, however. This implies that British 
institutions either value liquidity highly or believe that the gains 
from more intensive monitoring are small. Several different rea-
sons could plausibly underlie this assessment. 
First, the expected value of extending oversight beyond the 
most troubled firms is uncertain. Investors' perception of manage-
ment weakness is always tinged with uncertainty. Perhaps manage-
ment is doing a competent job in difficult circumstances. Or 
perhaps its mistakes cannot be easily fixed. If a fatal mistake has 
been made, the institutions may do better to sell and cut their losses 
than to stay and fight - a sentiment expressed to us repeatedly by 
fund managers, though not by insurers. 
188. One explanation for the difference in bank and insurer staffing could be the number 
of significant investments. We lack information on the relative size of bank loan portfolios 
and money manager equity portfolios, but our sense is that banks are probably less, or at 
least no more, diversified than insurers and money managers. If so, this cannot explain why 
banks are more thickly staffed. 
189. See Punters' progress (1991), supra note 55, at 88. 
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Second, intervention can sometimes aggravate the problem, 
consuming scarce managerial time and creating unfavorable public-
ity. Nor is it possible to put a financial value on most intervention. 
In the face of such uncertainty, it may make sense to intervene only 
at the crisis stage, when there is more upside potential and less 
downside risk. 
Third, in a competitive market for financial management serv-
ices, a fund manager cannot charge more than its peers for its serv-
ices unless it can demonstrate a better performance record. Here 
we come back to free riding and agency costs at the money manager 
level. A fund manager can outperform its rivals through corporate 
governance intervention only if it is overweighted in the company's 
stock. Even then, rivals will share in the gains. Overweighting, 
however, requires some sacrifice of liquidity. Institutional investors 
told us that they lose liquidity in smaller stocks even at a 5% own-
ership level. Thus, even if undervalued stocks are hard to find in a 
relatively efficient market, fund managers may still have an incen-
tive to invest in a low-probability search for them because they do 
not need to share the gains from search, rather than to expend 
funds on collective action. 
The free-rider problem becomes less significant as shareholder 
concentration increases, because it is easier to coordinate actions 
and prorate costs among the principal institutions. From this per-
spective, it is significant that British concentration levels, though 
higher than American levels, are substantially below those in Ger-
many. Although German institutional investors own directly only 
14% of publicly traded stock,190 there are only three "universal" 
banks, and they vote as nominees, on average, 45% of the stock 
present at the shareholders' meetings in the 100 largest German 
corporations.191 Collective action is surely easier in this context. 
Moreover, the marginal costs of activism may be less for a German 
universal bank than for a British insurer because the bank already 
incurs monitoring costs as a creditor. In Britain, most fund manag-
190. See Neville Nankivell, Good governance translates into good business, FIN. PoST, Jan. 
6, 1993, § 1, at 9. 
191. See Theodor Baums, The German Banking System and Its Impacts on Corporate 
Finance and Goverance 30-31 (Feb. 1993) (unpublished paper, Institut fur Handels-und Wirt-
schaftsrecht, on file with authors). In addition, the stock voted by all banks at these meetings 
averaged 82.67%. Id. In only one case, Baums finds, did banks vote less than a majority of 
the shares present at the meeting. Id. 
It should not be assumed, however, that the German pattern is optimal. Agency 
problems can arise when a monitor has voting power far greater than its equity ownership. 
For example, a German bank that owns 5% of a company's stock but votes 50% may discour-
age the company from taking risks, in order to protect the bank's position as a creditor, or 
the bank may tolerate inefficient diversification, which reduces its risk as a creditor. 
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ers and insurers are not significant lenders to the same firms, so 
these economies of monitoring cannot be realized. 
A further reason for limited investment in monitoring portfolio 
companies involves path-dependent organizational design. Any siz-
able institution is constrained in the things that it does well and the 
degree to which it can evolve by its existing infrastructure. In our 
interviews, we probed to find the kinds of interventions that fund 
managers consider feasible. When we asked if institutional inves-
tors would challenge the strategic business plans of a nonfailing 
company, fund managers told us in remarkably similar language: 
"We are stock traders, not business experts; there are limits to what 
we can do." 
Essentially, these are limits on the firm's human capital, as 
shaped by the organization's history, structure, and surrounding 
culture. Consider merchant banks, for example. Like U.S. invest-
ment banks, they have long seen their comparative advantage to lie 
in trading and providing financial services. During the 1980s, trad-
ing profits grew at U.S. investment banks, with the explosion in 
new, complex securities and resulting arbitrage opportunities. A 
similar pattern, we believe, characterized U.K. merchant banks. As 
a result, these firms' capital moved toward trading and away from 
underwriting. With this change, political power within the firms 
also shifted to traders. Yet, traders see illiquid, long-term invest-
ments as a classic mistake. By training and harsh experience, trad-
ers know that markets fluctuate and that one must maintain 
liquidity and cut losses when necessary. In the trader's culture, one 
does not resist the market's judgment over even the medium term 
in the hopes of securing ultimate vindication. In short, relational 
investing and the trader's culture are fundamentally in tension. 
The point here goes beyond the cautionary working rules by 
which merchant banks have grown and prospered. The merchant 
bank's human capital is focused on trading. The merchant bank 
develops expertise in predicting the future value of a corporation's 
securities, but much of that expertise is focused on the near term. 
The merchant bank need not simultaneously develop the capacity 
or inclination to intervene and restructure the corporation, save 
perhaps in extreme cases. 
An argument about the limited human capital of money man-
agement firms takes one only so far. If the profits were attractive 
enough, these firms could acquire the human capital needed to re-
habilitate mismanaged companies. But organizational change is 
difficult and risky. The new venture may fail; even worse, the effort 
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may dilute the firm's expertise in its current business. Nor is it clear 
that insurers or merchant banks should redeploy their human capi-
tal in this way. There are no role models to convince merchant 
banks that they can earn above-market returns through activist, 
long-term investing. 
The U.S. experience with leveraged buyouts is relevant in this 
regard. During the 1980s, leveraged buyout firms evolved in the 
United States - most prominently, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & 
Co. (KKR) and Forstmann Little & Co. - and undertook to 
restructure diversified firms. Initially, U.S. investment banks firms 
advised and financed the leveraged buyout firms but did not com-
pete directly with them. Only when they saw that enormous returns 
were possible did the largest firms - Merrill Lynch, First Boston, 
and Shearson Lehman - enter the field as buyout competitors. 
Similarly, British merchant banks seem likely to become relational 
investors and undertake to restructure faltering British companies 
only if some new entrant first demonstrates that large profits are 
attainable. As one fund manager told us, "Until you see that it 
works, you don't invest in a theory." 
Moreover, such a move, even if attempted, could well fail be-
cause the imitators lack the institutional capabilities of the first 
movers. Leveraged buyouts again offer an instructive example: 
leveraged acquisitions gone sour helped to drive Drexel Burnham 
into bankruptcy and forced First Boston to turn to its then-40% 
shareholder, Credit Suisse, for a bailout.192 
Failing such a development, institutional activism in the United 
Kingdom, we believe, will continue to be triggered primarily by 
clear managerial failure, though management's margin for error 
may diminish. The voices of institutional investors may help to es-
tablish new corporate governance norms, like majority independent 
boards, and to persuade laggard managers to accept the new norms. 
But frequent proactive monitoring remains unlikely. Instead, the 
dialogue between investors will remain a game of bluff and counter-
bluff, as institutions threaten to take steps that both sides know are 
costly to them.193 
192. See Steven Greenhouse, Reviving a Humbled First Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
1991, at Dl; Stephen Labaton, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
14, 1990, at D4; see also Bill Jamieson & Margareta Pagano, Gateway losing grocery battle, 
SuNDAY TELEGRAPH, May 17, 1992, at 33 (describing Wasserstein Perella's disastrous acqui-
sition of a large stake in Gateway). 
193. Others have disagreed with our conclusion that the relationship between investors 
and managers will not change radically in the near future. Samuel Graves and Sandra 
Waddock argue that institutional investors, and pension funds in particular, could become the 
"conglomerate of the 1990s," paralleling the role of the main bank in the Japanese keiretsu. 
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I. Are Banks Unique? 
Although we have developed reasons why insurers and money 
managers, which are the major equity holders in Britain, are thinly 
staffed and likely to remain so, this begs two critical questions: 
Why are banks more thickly staffed? And why do British banks, 
who could combine their natural lending role with an equity stake 
and thereby achieve monitoring synergies, hold so little equity? 
1. Why Do Banks Invest in Monitoring? 
Banks in Britain and other countries spend substantial resources 
to monitor their loan portfolios. One plausible reason relates to 
liquidity. Bank loans, especially troubled loans, are much less liq-
uid than corporate equities. Lacking the ability to sell and cut their 
losses, banks may be forced to invest heavily in monitoring and, 
equally important, in organizational structures that are conducive 
to monitoring. 
Closely tied to illiquidity is informational asymmetry. Lack of 
information about bank loans, especially the absence of a consensus 
price, not only makes sale difficult, it also forces the seller to accept 
a large discount on sale, to protect the buyer against the risk that 
the seller will unload "problem" loans when the sale price exceeds 
the loan's value. This is a classic "lemons" problem, in which high 
quality loans cannot be sold for a fair price. The gap between po-
tential sale price and actual value reduces the incentive to sell and 
leaves more room for banks to add value through monitoring. It is 
no accident that every major bank has a sizable workout 
department. 
Third, the agent bank typically holds a substantial fraction of the 
total loan for its own account. Even if the loan is largely syndi-
cated, the agent bank's reputation, and thus its ability to syndicate 
future loans, depends on its monitoring success. Thus, both agency 
costs at the investor level and collective action effects are reduced. 
Again, the effect is to justify more monitoring. 
Samuel B. Graves & Sandra A. Waddock, Ownership at a Distance: Implications of Activist 
Institutional Investors, Bus. CoNTEMP. WORLD, Spring 1990, at 83. Such a prediction, how-
ever, fails to "unpack" the pension fund and see it as a pool of financial assets, nominally 
administered by trustees but actually run by money managers located in merchant banks and 
insurers. Once the focus is shifted to professional money managers, those managers' incen-
tives to engage in collective action are weaker, their conflicts of interest are stronger, and, as 
discussed in the next section, their ability to acquire the monitoring capacity of a commercial 
bank is questionable. 
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We are not alone in speculating that other institutions, who are 
more natural equity holders, may be intrinsically weaker monitors. 
R.E. Artus of Prudential has written: 
My guess is that any conceivable increase in [shareholder] activity will 
not ... match[] that of the bank-based economies, since share owner-
ship unaccompanied by the additional involvement in providing fi-
nance and other services will never provide the depth of knowledge 
and commitment that arises with the combination of banking and pro-
prietary interests.194 
2. Why Don't British Banks Hold More Equities? 
British banks hold little equity. They voluntarily forgo the mon-
itoring synergies that would arise if they held both debt and equity 
in the same firm: holding both equity and debt increases influence; 
the gains from oversight flow to both sets of holdings; and substan-
tial monitoring is already justified on the loan side. 
One possible reason is that, like banks in many industrialized 
economies, British banks combine thin equity - equity capital 
equal to a small percentage of total assets - with a timing mis-
match between their assets and liabilities. That is, their assets, 
which are chiefly loans, are illiquid, while most of their liabilities 
are short-term deposits, often due on demand.195 Hence banks and 
their regulators have to worry about "runs" - sudden mutually 
reinforcing decisions by depositors to withdraw their funds. 
A bank that holds large blocks of stock aggravates the timing 
mismatch between its assets and liabilities by exposing itself to the 
greater volatility of common stock. For example, assume that a 
British commercial bank held 20% of its assets in stocks and had 
net worth equal to 4% of its assets. In October 1987, when stocks 
declined over 20% in one day in most major securities markets, 
such a bank would have been rendered technically insolvent. Its 
total assets, valued at market, would have fallen below its total lia-
bilities. Even without regulation, rational bank executives recog-
nize this danger and confine stock investments to a modest portion 
of the bank's portfolio. Moreover, bear markets for stocks tend to 
correlate with an increase in troubled loans - the bank gains little 
diversification by holding this asset class. 
Even so, British banks seem to display an overabundance of 
caution. Their investments in equity securities today amount to 
under 1 % of their assets. This level has not risen since regulatory 
194. Artus (1990), supra note 11, at 14. 
195. See Coffee (1991), supra note 3, at 1318-21. 
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restrictions were lifted in the 1970s.196 Indeed, as a historical mat-
ter, the major London banks have never played a significant role -
as shareholders or as lenders - in major British corporations.197 
German and Japanese banks have overcome the thin equity hur-
dle. Why the difference? One possible explanation takes us back 
to the political story and the likely importance of path dependence. 
Banks are natural monitors because they must already monitor 
their loans. But they ·can hold large, risky stock positions only if 
they have a large equity base as a percentage of assets. If German 
and Japanese banks - in part because of government encourage-
ment 198 - became large stockholders early on and built their eq-
uity base as their stockholdings grew in value, this situation could 
be stable for a substantial period of time. Then, with the introduc-
tion of deposit insurance later in this century in both Germay and 
Great Britain, banks probably found it cheaper to raise capital from 
depositors than from equity shareholders.199 In any event, after the 
appearance of deposit insurance, bank depositors in both countries 
had less incentive to demand that their banks maintain a substantial 
equity capital to support their debt claims. As a result, the initial 
disparity between the equity base of German banks and that of 
British banks may have become locked in, as thin equity became a 
permanent characteristic of British institutions seeking to raise cap-
ital at the lowest cost. In addition, monitoring synergies are proba-
bly smaller today than in the past because large companies are 
increasingly able to borrow in the public debt markets more 
cheaply than from banks. 
196. See supra Table 1. 
197. See Scorr (1986), supra note 101, at 2. Scott notes that local "country" banks 
outside the metropolitan centers of Great Britain financed the infant companies that began 
the Industrial Revolution. Id. 
198. The evidence on the close involvement of German governmental and political forces 
in the growth of Germany's universal banks is well known. See, e.g., RICHARD TILLY, FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE RHINELAND 1815-1870 (1966); Richard 
H. Tiily, German Banking, 1850-1914: Developmental Assistance for the Strong, 15 J. EuR. 
EcoN. HIST. 113 (1986). 
199. Deposit insurance arrived relatively late in both Germany and Great Britain. In 
Germany, although the historical roots of deposit insurance date back to the 1930s, deposit 
insurance was not extended to the large commercial banks before the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Initially, deposits were insured only up to a relatively low level (DM 10,000). Follow-
ing the collpase of the Herstatt Bank in 1974, Germany's private banks (which category in-
cludes its universal banks) established a Deposit Protection Fund with greatly increased 
coverage that today insures virtually 100% of all deposits. See MARIA L. FRES-FELIX, DE-
POSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES 31-37 (1991). 
In Great Britain, deposit insurance is today mandatory with the creation of the Deposit 
Protection Fund in 1982. The Fund is administered by the Bank of England and covers 75% 
of deposits of up to £20,000 (effectively the Fund covers a maximum of £15,000). As in 
Germany, the creation of this Fund was a response to banking failures in the 1970s. Id. at 39-
40. 
2076 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1997 
From this perspective, there may have been a brief window pe-
riod early in this century when banks having a large equity base 
could have exploited their position as joint holders of debt and eq-
uity. Today, that moment seems to have passed, and the incremen-
tal value from holding long-term equity stakes and engaging in 
active monitoring would not justify building a costly equity base. 
More recently, as public debt financing for corporations became 
more widely available, British banks lost the potential monitoring 
synergy from holding both debt and equity. Moreover, in Britain, 
insurers were already large equity holders and moderately active 
monitors. The insurers may already be capturing the easy gains 
from monitoring. The question for banks is then whether the re-
maining gains from more intense monitoring justify building large 
equity holdings and taking the accompanying risk. They apparently 
think not. 
A second explanation for the larger equity holdings of Japanese 
and German banks begins with the much closer relationship be-
tween the major banks and the central government in both coun-
tries. Germany has only three universal banks, which are too big 
for the government to let fail. Being smaller, British banks are less 
assured of a government bailout if the equity market sours and thus 
can take less equity risk. In Japan, the risk of equity investments 
for banks is limited both by an implicit government guarantee 
against bank failure and by the alleged willingness of other mem-
bers of the bank's industrial group (keiretsu) to support the stock 
market prices of their main bank and of the principal keiretsu mem-
bers.200 Indeed, the stock of most Japanese banks is held princi-
pally by others in the same keiretsu, or other firms that the bank 
lends to, leaving only a small public float.201 In such an environ-
ment, the willingness of Japanese banks to hold large equity stakes 
could, in part, refle~t keiretsu members' ability to stabilize the mar-
ket prices of keiretsu members. Thus, Japanese banks may face a 
smaller risk of sudden stock price declines than a Western bank 
making similarly large equity investments. 
200. See Marshall Auerback, Japan Inc. 's Days Are Numbered, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1991, 
at Al8. 
201. At the end of 1989, the free float in most Japanese bank stocks was as low as 8% of 
the outstanding shares. This lets keiretsu members support the market price of their main 
bank's stock through relatively small additional purchases. Id. With the more recent decline 
in Japanese stock prices, this reciprocal system of price support has come under increasing 
strain, and it will be instructive to see if Japanese banks reduce either the size of their equity 
stakes or their total stock investments. 
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The organizational change that would be needed for British 
commercial banks to become serious equity investors may also dis-
suade them. The required transformation seems easily as great as 
that which trading-oriented merchant banks would have to undergo 
to become long-term investors. Perhaps too, there are gains to 
holding large stakes with corresponding influence, but only small 
gains to holding smaller, less influential 1 %-3% stakes. In such a 
world, banks with puny equity holdings will see much risk and little 
gain from increasing these holdings. · 
Pulling these pieces together, we believe that it is probably too 
late for British banks to become large equity holders. Perhaps the 
opportunity would have existed in the past, in a more inviting regu-
latory climate or perhaps banks will become large equity holders 
only with an affirmative regulatory shove, as was apparently the 
case in Japan and Germany.202 On this we can only speculate. But 
for British banks, the window of opportunity, if it was ever open, 
now seems firmly shut and unlikely to open again. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS: WHAT THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE MEANS 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The heavily institutionalized British securities market may offer 
a preview of what American securities markets will look like in a 
decade or so. What then does current British experience predict for 
the United States? To address this question, one needs to break it 
down into several component parts: 
(1) What level of coordinated activity among institutional inves-
tors appears likely in the United States if the level· of institutional 
ownership continues to rise? 
(2) If Glass-Steagall and similar legislation were repealed or re-
laxed, would American banks become large equity holders and ac-
tive monitors, like the German "universal" banks or the Japanese 
"main" banks? 
(3) To what degree is institutional investor behavior path de-
pendent - shaped and constrained as much by the limited mutabil-
ity of existing organizations as by external factors, such as 
regulation? 
( 4) If American banks and insurers remain largely passive, cari 
American mutual funds or pension funds fill the corporate govern-
202. See Roe (1993), supra note 7, at 1955-56, 1971-72; TILLY (1966), supra note 198; Tiily 
(1986), supra note 198. 
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ance role played by Japanese and German banks and by British 
insurers? 
(5) What changes in U.S. regulation would prompt American 
institutions, taken as a whole, to act as British institutions now do? 
(6) What can the British experience tell us about the desirabil-
ity of those regulatory changes? 
A. How Will Institutional Cooperation Evolve in the United 
States? 
An initial question is whether the United States, if it approaches 
British levels of institutional ownership, will also approach British 
levels of institutional activism. The probable answer is no. Several 
factors seem likely to dampen U.S. oversight relative to British 
oversight. 
First, U.S. institutions are unlikely to approach the level of con-
centration or the geographic and cultural cohesion of the City, 
where contact among institutional investors is constant. Lower con-
centration means that coalitions of U.S. institutional investors will 
have to have more members to aggregate the same percentage of 
stock. Yet the British experience suggests that keeping group size 
to a minimum is important in reducing coordination costs. More-
over, for a given level of ownership concentration, the City's geo-
graphic and cultural cohesion reduces coordination costs. Thus, 
coordination costs seem likely to remain lower in Britain than in 
the United States. 
Second, the British experience highlights the importance of fund 
managers' incentives. British institutions look to those who are 
overweighted in a stock to organize a shareholder coalition. It has 
often been claimed that as institutional investors hold larger stakes 
in corporations, they will naturally become more active investors.203 
The British experience, however, suggests that fund managers focus 
more on relative performance than absolute performance. Ameri-
can institutions, like their British counterparts, may be less willing 
to join coalitions or to take collective action because their success 
will benefit others as much or more as themselves. In short, a large 
stakeholder will not necessarily be an active investor, even apart 
from conflicts of interest or regulatory constraints. 
Third, British institutions' leverage over corporate manage-
ments is in considerable measure the product of their ability to col-
203. See, e.g., Black {1990), supra note 2, at 575-84 {developing a model in which share-
holder activism increases with the size of shareholdings). 
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lectively decline to participate in a subscription offering. This 
market weapon has strong advantages over the proxy contest, 
which requires money managers to bear large direct and indirect 
costs. American institutions lack a comparable weapon. Preemp-
tive rights are optional under most state corporate statutes and are 
rarely found among large U.S. firms. Moreover, the effectiveness 
of refusal to subscribe as a shareholder strategy increases with con-
centration of shareholdings and requires mutual trust among the 
large institutions that a promise not to subscribe will be honored, 
despite the short-term gains from subscribing or selling one's rights. 
Fourth, as we discuss in section VI.C, it seems unlikely that U.S. 
banks or insurers will quickly become active shareholders even if 
the remaining regulatory barriers disappeared tomorrow. There is 
reason to doubt whether American mutual funds or pension funds 
will be willing, or can easily develop the institutional capability, to 
serve the role that British insurers now play. 
Fifth, important regulatory differences exist between the two 
countries. In particular, U.S. law forbids institutions from acting 
jointly in the quiet, behind-the-scenes fashion that is typical in Brit-
ain.204 Thus far, American institutions are mostly unwilling to 
make the public Schedule 13D filing that must accompany any vot-
ing or cost-sharing agreement among shareholders holding 5% or 
more of a company's stock.205 Still, because these rules are deeply 
intertwined with the American preference for sunlight and market 
transparency, only limited relaxations of them seem likely. More-
over, American-style litigiousness has not yet penetrated the British 
corporate landscape. A British institution's effort to change man-
agement is unlikely to involve heavy legal bills. ' 
B. Can Rf!gulation Explain Bank and Insurer Behavior? 
The British example sheds light on a central question: What 
role does legal regulation play in fostering the passivity of Ameri-
can banks and insurers? In the United States, bank and insurance 
regulation discourages or prohibits significant stock ownership; in 
Britain, these regulatory obstacles are absent. If a web of regula-
tion has pacified American banks and insurers, as the political 
model of American corporate governance predicts, then similar but 
204. See generally id. (describing securities law constraints on American financial 
institutions). 
205. See, e.g., Robert Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. Bus. 
REv., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140, 145 (Pozen, a managing director of Fidelity Investments, advises 
that: "At the end of [a conversation on a voting proposal], both parties should state clearly 
that they will not be voting together or buying or selling securities together."). 
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less regulated British institutions should be active investors, holding 
large stakes and perhaps paralleling the activities of large Japanese 
and German banks. Conversely, if regulatory controls do not ex-
plain investor behavior, one might expect British investors to be-
have much like their American brethren. 
The British evidence fits neither pattern well. British institu-
tions are more active than their American counterparts. Regula-
tory differences may explain some of this difference. However, 
regulation cannot explain the very different behavior of different 
classes of British institutions. British insurance companies have tra-
ditionally been the most active investors in the United Kingdom, 
but British banks hold almost no British equities. Why the 
difference? 
We have already explored the possible reasons why British 
banks did not become large shareholders. Insurers are potentially 
subject to similar problems, but British insurers are substantial eq-
uity investors. A closer look at British insurers shows how they 
have avoided the thin equity problem of the banks. First, insurance 
company creditors - that is, policyholders - can be locked into 
their investments, through sales loads, up-front commissions, and 
liquidation penalties, to a greater degree than bank depositors. 
Thus, the risk of a sudden massive withdrawal of funds is re-
duced.206 More importantly, British insurance companies devel-
oped techniques by which to pass equity risk to their policyholders. 
British insurers first began to invest heavily in equities during the 
1930s.207 This movement was led by the mutual insurers, whose 
policyholders, who were also in effect their shareholders, bore the 
equity risk.208 In time, the joint-stock insurers copied the mutuals' 
success by designing financial products with variable returns based 
on market performance. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, life insurance has been a pop-
ular form of retirement savings in Britain, particularly among the 
working class.209 With the explosive growth in retirement savings 
206. Although runs on insurance companies are rare, they do occur. See, e.g., Best's In· 
solvency Study: Life/Health Insurers 1976-1991, BEST'S RE.v., June 1992, at 18, 130 (stating 
that policyholder runs precipitated the collapse of Executive Life and Mutual Benefit Life in 
1991). 
207. Scorr (1986), supra note 101, at 88-89. 
208. As of 1951, some mutual insurers had 30% of their assets invested in stocks, while 
joint-stock insurers had only 10% of their assets similarly invested. Id. at 89. This suggests 
that market-volatility risk inhibited stock ownership, a factor that would apply even more 
strongly to banks. 
209. Id. 
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after World War Il,210 U.K. life insurers were flush with cash and 
increased their stakes in British corporations. By the mid-1950s, 
Prudential, for example, held 5% or larger stakes in a number of 
the largest British corporations.211 
Banks, in contrast, were not the natural repository for individu-
als' long-term retirement savings. Perhaps as a result, they have 
never designed financial products that pass along or share the eq-
uity risk of stock investments with their depositors. Yet, for at least 
the last fifteen years, there has been no regulatory barrier to banks' 
developing such products. The obvious explanation is one of indus-
try specialization: insurers provide these products, and banks have 
no comparative advantage.212 
To understand the British mix of activism and passivity, it is not 
enough to explain why British insurers hold stock and British banks 
do not. We must also seek to understand why the large British in-
surers - notably Prudential, Norwich Union, and Legal & General 
- are among the most activist U.K. institutions, while many pen-
sion fund managers with portfolios of similar size are less active. 
The insurers appear to be less constrained by the costs of activism 
that loomed large for many of the fund managers that we inter-
viewed. Here, it may be important that insurance companies are 
"true" owners of a substantial portion of their portfolios. 
A hypothesis: Institutions, like British insurers, who both own 
substantial equity stakes for their own account and manage funds 
for others, will more readily conclude that expenditures on corpo-
rate governance are in the interests of those whom they serve as 
fiduciaries than will institutions who invest almost exclusively on 
behalf of others. It is, after all, a conclusion that meshes with their 
own self-interest, because it allows them to spread costs among 
others receiving benefits. In this, British insurers look at least 
somewhat similar to German universal banks, who own significant 
equity stakes and hold and vote even greater equity investments as 
fiduciaries for individual customers. At the same time, the histori-
cal evolution and comparative freedom from regulation of British 
insurers may explain why they hold more stock for their own ac-
count and are much more active than American insurers. 
210. See Davies (1994), supra note 8, at 258-61. 
211. Scorr (1986), supra note 101, at 89-90. 
212. In the United States, life insurance annuities receive favorable tax treatment that is 
not available to banks offering similar products. See I.R.C. §§ 805, 808, 815 (1988). We do 
not know whether British tax law similarly favors insurers. 
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C. Path Dependence 
Path dependence in the evolution of financial institutions, we 
have suggested, is important in understanding why British banks 
own almost no stock and play a trivial role in British corporate gov-
ernance, in sharp contrast to German and Japanese banks. Path 
dependence will likely also be critical in shaping the future course 
of American corporate governance, even if legal barriers to share-
holder action are reduced. In the United States, as in Britain, the 
time when banks were major lenders to large corporations has 
passed. In the United States, as in Britain, other institutions have 
filled, at least in part, the corporate governance vacuum left by the 
banks' absence. In the United States, as in Britain, the dominant 
source of the funds that financial institutions manage is retirement 
savings, primarily through pension plans. Finally, in the United 
States, even more than in Great Britain, the existence of mandatory 
deposit insurance is likely to reduce any interest U.S. banks might 
have in developing the equity-capital base necessary to support sub-
stantial equity investments. 
In the United States, as in Britain, then, financial institution in-
volvement in corporate governance is likely to involve a small role 
for commercial banks and a large role for the institutions that man-
age retirement savings - corporate pension plans, public pension 
plans, and outside money managers for these plans. But over the 
long term, the dominant players are difficult to discern. Today, 
pension funds loom large. Public and private pensions together 
hold around 30% of all U.S. equities and around 60% of all equities 
held by financial institutions. Public pension plans are vocal, while 
corporate pension plans are mostly passive - partly because they 
are controlled by corporate managers. For reasons unrelated to 
corporate governance, defined contribution and 401(k) plans have 
grown rapidly, partly at the expense of defined benefit pension 
plans. Defined contribution and 401(k) plan growth, in turn, has 
helped to fuel the growth of the major mutual fund complexes that 
are the natural repositories for investment of employee-directed 
pension assets. It is possible that mutual fund groups, through a 
combination of individual accounts and corporate-derived pension 
accounts, will have the size to play at least a coequal role with pub-
lic pension plans in American corporate governance twenty years 
hence - if they choose to. 
American insurers seem unlikely to approach the role played by 
British insurers. Direct regulatory limits on insurers holding stock 
have largely disappeared, but net capital rules still limit insurers' 
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shareholdings. Perhaps more importantly, a high-cost sales appara-
tus, developed to sell individual life insurance policies, impedes the 
insurers' effort to capture individual retirement assets. The cost of 
an army of insurance agents drags down the returns on variable an-
nuities, compared to competing mutual funds, while the tax deferral 
benefits available through 401(k) plans substantially offset the 
deferral offered by life insurance policies. 
Path dependence may help to explain the uphill battle that 
American insurers now face in competing with mutual funds and 
private pension managers. When British insurers, beginning in the 
1930s, were developing variable annuities and reaping the advan-
tages that accrue to the first mover in collecting household retire-
ment funds, American insurers could not hold stock. They 
developed a sales structure and institutional expertise appropriate 
to the fixed-payoff products they could sell. By the time the insur-
ers could become major equity players, pension fund managers and 
mutual funds had captured the lion's share of the variable-payoff 
market. 
If we are unsure which American financial institutions will be 
the most significant, we can be even less confident in predicting 
how they might behave in a less-regulated environment. Mutual 
funds, for example, began as trading and stock-picking institutions. 
Mutual fund groups arose later, because of economies of scale in 
servicing large numbers of individual accounts and economies of 
scope in one-stop shopping for different types of mutual funds. To-
day, the major fund groups combine centralized account adminis-
tration and marketing with decentralized stock-picking. One 
Fidelity fund might be buying the same stock that two others are 
selling. With rare exceptions, the individual funds within a group 
are too small to have much influence on the companies they invest 
in. 
Mutual fund influence must flow primarily from the aggregated 
holdings of the multiple funds in an affiliated group. But most mu-
tual funds today lack that level of coordination. Will the potentiaf 
profits from monitoring, shared across the funds in a fund group, 
justify the organizational innovation needed to capture these prof-
its? For corporate governance initiatives, the profit opportunity is 
subtle, hard to quantify, shared with one's competitors, and im-
peded by regulatory barriers. Under those circumstances, mutual 
fund groups, whose institutional structure developed when over-
sight of corporate managers was not a realistic possibility, could fail 
to adapt to this new business opportunity, even if the opportunity is 
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real. Moreover, because mutual funds invest strictly as agents, and 
not for their own account, their strong concern with relative per-
formance could dampen their incentive to invest on oversight, much 
as concern with relative performance explains the passivity of un-
derweighted British institutions. We will simply have to wait and 
see. 
D. International Convergence 
One finds recurring hints, in the British experience, that we may 
be in the early stages of an international convergence in institu-
tional behavior. Capital flows and financial institutions are increas-
ingly international in scope. As financial institutions expand their 
international presence, they are increasingly exposed both to differ-
ent expectations as to how they will act and to competition from 
other institutions with different histories. 
For example, vocal shareholder activism, American style, is both 
being brought to other countries by American institutions and piqu-
ing interest among foreign institutions.213 We have already dis-
cussed the efforts by Fidelity Investments at Brown & Jackson and 
WPP. Conversely, Japanese- or German-style long-term relational 
investing, and British-style informal discussions with management, 
are'piquing American interest. 
As U.S. institutions buy and vote more foreign shares, they ap-
pear to be inducing change in the traditional British practice of not 
bothering to vote. British institutions are finding that if they do not 
vote, foreign-held shares will carry disproportionate weight in the 
final tally. Institutions accustomed to voting are complaining about 
the weighted-voting schemes that are common in Europe, though it 
is to early to tell how effective such complaints will be.214 
Regulatory convergence is chancier than cultural convergence 
because it will be mediated by local politics, but some convergence 
is already occurring. Examples include the worldwide net capital 
rules for commercial banks adopted by the Bank for International 
Settlements; British adoption of elements of the strong disclosure 
rules that have long been a part of U.S. securities regulation; and 
the Cadbury Committee recommendation, patterned on U.S. and 
213. See, e.g., Cohen (1993), supra note 125, at 12; Melcher & Oster (1993), supra note 41; 
Roger Miles, Stirrings of Activism in the U.K., GEORGESON REP. (Georgeson & Co., New 
York, N.Y.), Summer 1993, at 5. 
214. See, e.g., Richard C. Morais, Such selfimportance, FORBES, Apr. 12, 1993, at 44. 
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Canadian practice, that public firms have audit committees com-
posed exclusively of outside directors.21s 
E. Is British-Style Intervention Desirable? 
We have suggested above that the United States will not easily 
achieve even the British level of oversight of corporate managers by 
major financial institutions. But the United States has moved in 
that direction though proxy reform, and could surely move further 
through additional legal reform. What insight does the British ex-
perience shed on the desirability of that reform? 
On the whole, from an American perspective, the British corpo-
rate governance model seems moderately attractive. The proce-
dural and structural steps that British institutional shareholders 
have taken, such as discouraging dual-class voting structures, pre-
serving preemptive rights, and pressing for separation of the posts 
of chairman and chief executive, seem sensible. Crisis-driven, com-
pany-specific intervention is unlikely to cause harm to already well-
run companies. Thus, concerns that financial institutions will med-
dle in ordinary business decisions seem ill-founded. The institu-
tions have neither the· time nor, as they are quick to point out, the 
expertise. Even in a crisis, British institutions are reluctant to boot 
out the old managers until they have found a promising successor. 
Moreover, this intervention seems directed at a class of firms 
whose problems are not effectively addressed by takeovers. 
Although replacing inefficient management is an important motive 
in at least some takeovers,216 seriously troubled firms tend not to 
become targets, at least in Britain.217 Perhaps, uncertainty about 
just how bad these firms' problems are and whether an outsider can 
fix them is too great for a raider to make a hostile bid . 
. To be sure, British industry, taken as a whole, is not usually held 
out as a shining example of economic success. But that may merely 
show that other factors matter more than corporate governance in 
determining a country's overall economic success. We can still 
learn from the British in the corporate governance area - where 
they have apparently had moderate success with a system not so 
different from ours. 
215. See CADBURY CoMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 61, 'll'J[ 4.33-4.38 & app. 4 (discussing 
U.S. and Canadian audit committee rules and experience). 
216. See GILSON & BLACK (1993), supra note 135 ch. 10. 
217. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers in the UK and the Correction 
of Managerial Failure (Apr. 1993) (unpublished discussion paper, London Business School 
and University of Warwick, on file with authors). 
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE HALF-FULL GLASS 
U.K. institutions are more involved in corporate governance 
than their U.S. counterparts. This is one central conclusion from 
our research. But institutional activity in the United Kingdom is 
still constrained by the costs associated with forming and maintain-
ing shareholder coalitions and the limited incentives of money man-
agers to invest in monitoring. Thus, the British experience suggests 
two lessons for the United States: (i) Reduce regulatory controls 
and institutional investors will become more active; and (ii) reduce 
regulatory controls and other constraints will surface that preclude 
radical change. One can debate, we suppose, whether the glass of 
water is half full or half empty. We are content with observing that, 
when regulatory inhibitions are relaxed, the glass is neither full nor 
empty. 
Moreover, the conventional wisdom that institutional investors 
in the British market-centered system are significantly less involved 
in corporate governance than major banks in bank-centered sys-
tems like Japan and Germany may riot be accurate. Oversight 
could plausibly be more thorough in bank-centered systems, be-
cause the banks have a larger investment and can realize economies 
of scale in their dual role as both an equity and a debt monitor. But 
Japanese and German banks, like British financial institutions, are 
slow to intervene unless a client corporation is in serious trouble. 
Conflicts of interest and mutual back-scratching can also constrain 
monitoring within the bank-centered systems. How different the 
level of actual oversight is between bank-centered and market-cen-
tered systems remains uncertain.21s 
We may be discovering, in the British experience, a different 
kind of inherent limit on shareholder monitoring of management -
not the complete passivity announced by Berle and Means and 
based on the separation of ownership and control, but rather the 
reluctance of even large shareholders to intervene, based on imper-
fect information, limited institutional capabilities, substantial coor-
dination costs, the misaligned incentives of money managers, a 
preference for liquidity, and the uncertain benefits of intervention. 
Agency costs at the fund-manager level may be no less important 
than at the corporate-manager level, with the fund manager focused 
more on performance relative to its rivals than on absolute per-
formance. Coordination costs persist even when financial in-
218. Cf. J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102 
YALE LJ. 2005, 2010·11 (1993) (questioning whether "Japanese main banks do significantly 
more (monitoring] than other banks elsewhere"). 
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termediaries aggregate large blocks of stock so as to possess the 
"clout" that the Berle-Means shareholder lacks. 
As a result, shareholder oversight of corporate managers will 
always be a matter of more or less and will need supplementation 
by other constraints. Installing a strong board is, no doubt, a cen-
tral shareholder task, but it is no panacea: the most able directors 
often have other full-time jobs; corporate officers control the infor-
mation that flows to the board; small-group dynamics and consen-
sus decisionmaking inhibit fast action. Agency theorists might say: 
We could have told you so. 
How much shareholder oversight, and what kind of oversight, 
would occur in a less-regulated U.S. market? We see no determi-
nate answers to this question. Instead, the evolution of a corporate 
governance system, within any given set of legal constraints, is 
likely overdetermined. At the same time, the multiple constraints 
on oversight give us confidence that deregulation to permit Ameri-
can institutions to act more like their British counterparts will not 
unleash massive, misguided institutional meddling in corporate af-
fairs. Quite the opposite - the British are far more concerned 
with getting their large institutions to pay attention to corporate 
governance than with stopping them from intervening too much. 
Moreover, there are severe constraints on the mutability of finan-
cial institutions. What U.S. financial institutions can do depends on 
what they have done, or not done, in the past. In all likelihood, 
U.S. institutions will remain less active than their British counter-
parts for some time to come. 
